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Abstract
This paper develops a framework for studying the optimal product range choice
of a multiproduct intermediary when consumers demand multiple products. In
the optimal product selection, the intermediary uses exclusively stocked high-value
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t mainly from
non-exclusively stocked products which are relatively cheap to buy from upstream
suppliers. By doing this the intermediary can earn strictly positive prot, including
in situations where it does not improve e¢ ciency in selling products. A linkage
between product selection and product demand features such as size and shape is
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1 Introduction
Many products are traded through intermediaries. A leading example is that of retailers,
who buy up products from manufacturers and resell them to consumers. Choosing which
products to stock is an important decision for retailers. Consumers are usually interested
in buying a basket of products, but nd it costly to shop around and so tend to buy from
a limited number of retailers whose product ranges closely match their needs. However,
at the same time retailers are often constrained in how many products they can sell,
for example due to limited stocking space or the fact that stocking too many products
can make the in-store shopping experience less pleasant.1 Moreover products di¤er in
their desirability for consumers and protability for sellers, and their demands can be
interdependent in a multiproduct environment. This further complicates the product
selection problem.
Very much related to the stocking problem is the issue of exclusivity. In particular, in
order to make themselves more attractive to consumers, retailers are increasingly o¤ering
exclusive products that are not available for purchase elsewhere. They do this either by
making large investments in their own private brands, or by paying manufacturers for
exclusive rights to sell their products. For example in 2009, US departments stores such
as Macys and J.C. Penney generated over 40% of their sales from exclusive products.2
Surprisingly, there are very few papers which study a retailers optimal choice of
product range and product exclusivity. (This contrasts with the voluminous literature
on other aspects of a retailers problem, such as pricing and location choice.) Our paper
seeks to ll this gap by developing a multiproduct intermediary framework which can help
study these issues in a tractable way. Our paper makes several contributions. Firstly, we
provide a new rationale for the existence of intermediaries. In particular we show that
when consumers have multiproduct demand, a multiproduct retailer can use exclusivity
to enter a market and make strictly positive prot, even if it is no more e¢ cient in selling
products than the smaller sellers which it displaces. Secondly and most importantly,
we characterize the retailers optimal product selection. Specically, we show how all
1Even large retailers like Walmart face such constraints. Many consumers have to go to smaller stores
to buy some hard-to-nd products. (See http://goo.gl/MV6FRi for some evidence on this.)
2See http://goo.gl/lfS9QP for further details. Exclusivity is also common in other parts of the retail
market. For instance Home Depot has many exclusive brands such as American Woodmark in cabinets,
and Martha Stewart in outdoor furniture and indoor organization. Target is well-known for o¤ering
exclusive brands in apparel and home goods. Many high-end fashion stores also sell unique colors or
versions of certain labels.
2
information contained in a products demand curve can be represented by a simple two-
dimensional su¢ cient statistic, which in turn determines whether the retailer chooses to
stock that product, and whether it does so exclusively. We also show how these choices
can be understood in terms of simple properties of the products demand curve, such as
its size and shape. Thirdly, we show that a prot-maximizing retailer tends to be too big
and stock too many exclusive products relative to the social optimum.
In more detail, Section 2 introduces our main model in which a continuum of manufac-
turers each produces a di¤erent product. Consumers view these products as independent
and are interested in buying all of them, although di¤erent products are allowed to have
di¤erent demands. A manufacturers product can be sold either through a single-product
(specialist) store, a multiproduct (generalist) retailer, or both. The single-product retailer
can be interpreted as either the manufacturers own retail outlet or a completely indepen-
dent store, and both interpretations give rise to the same results in our model. We choose
to frame the paper in terms of the former interpretation, given that with development of
e-commerce manufacturers are increasingly selling their products direct to consumers.3
The multiproduct retailer o¤ers to compensate manufacturers in exchange for the right
to sell their products, and as part of this can demand exclusive sales rights. We also allow
for the possibility that the retailer has a stocking constraint. Consumers are aware of
who sells what, but have to pay a cost to learn a rms price(s) and buy its product(s).
The cost of searching the intermediary is (weakly) increasing in the number of products it
stocks, consistent for example with the idea that larger retailers are located further from
consumers, or o¤er a worse instore shopping experience. Consumers also di¤er in their
search costs, such that in equilibrium some end up buying more products than others.
Since the focus of our paper is product range choice, we intentionally simplify sell-
erspricing problems. In particular we assume that the intermediary can o¤er two-part
tari¤ contracts to manufacturers. We then prove that irrespective of the market struc-
ture, each supplier of a given product always charges the usual monopoly price.4 This
enables us to study product range choice in a tractable way, because it allows us to
3A 2016 Forbes article reports: The number of manufacturers selling directly to consumers is expected
to grow 71% this year to more than 40% of all manufacturers. And over a third of consumers report they
bought directly from a brand manufacturers website last year. (See https://goo.gl/29uWSE) Along
the same lines, a 2017 report by the European Commission states that many retailers... [now nd]
themselves competing against their own suppliers.(See p. 288 of https://goo.gl/Xg71n2)
4Intuitively, with two-part tari¤s the intermediary can get a wholesale price at the marginal cost and
avoid double marginalization, and with search frictions the logic of Diamond (1971) implies no price
competition even if a product is sold by both its manufacturer and the intermediary.
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summarize all information on a products cost and demand characteristics via a simple
two-dimensional statistic (; v), where  represents a products monopoly prot and v
represents its monopoly consumer surplus. The intermediarys problem is then to choose
a set of points within (; v) space that it will stock exclusively, and another set of points
which it will stock non-exclusively.
In Section 3 we rst solve a special case of the model in order to highlight some of
the main economic forces at work. In particular we consider the situation in which the
intermediary can stock as many products as it likes, but is restricted to using exclusive
contracts, and o¤ers no economies of search (i.e. the cost of searching the intermediary is
the same as searching all of the manufacturers whose products it sells). We rst prove that
the intermediary earns strictly positive prot, and so will be active despite not improving
search e¢ ciency. We also prove that the intermediary stocks a strict subset of the product
space i.e. it voluntarily limits its product range.
We then derive the intermediarys optimal stocking policy in this special case. One
might expect the intermediary to sell products with relatively high values of  and v,
but this turns out to be incorrect. Instead the intermediarys optimal product range
exhibits a form of negative correlationin (; v) space, consisting of two regions in the
top-left and the bottom-right. Intuitively a consumer searches the retailer (respectively,
an individual manufacturer) if its average (respectively, individual) v exceeds her unit
search cost. Consequently demand for a low-v product increases when the intermediary
stocks it, and since the manufacturer need only be compensated for its lost sales, these
products are prot generators. Nevertheless the intermediary cannot stock too many low-
v products otherwise it becomes less attractive to consumers, and therefore only stocks
a limited number of the most protable ones i.e. those with high . Conversely demand
for high-v products falls when the intermediary stocks them, and hence it makes a loss
on them. These products are useful in attracting consumers, so the intermediary stocks
some of them, but it manages its losses by choosing these products to have relatively low
.
In Section 4 we solve for the intermediarys optimal product range in the general case,
where the intermediary can also use non-exclusive contracts and can provide economies
of search. The intermediary faces the following tradeo¤ when deciding whether to stock
a product exclusively or non-exclusively. On the one hand consumers are more likely
to search it when it has many exclusive products which are not available for purchase
elsewhere. On the other hand the intermediary also needs to compensate manufacturers
more if it stocks their product exclusively, since manufacturers lose the ability to sell to
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consumers who are not interested in shopping at the intermediary. We show that when
the stocking space constraint does not bind, the optimal product selection is similar to
the special case, except that the intermediary also stocks products in the top-right part of
(; v) space non-exclusively. Intuitively by stocking the latter products non-exclusively,
the intermediary attracts more consumers due to economies of search, but still allows
consumers who do not visit it to buy those products from their respective manufacturers,
thus reducing how much those manufacturers need to be compensated. We also show
that as the intermediarys stocking space becomes smaller, the intermediarys optimal
product range contains fewer and fewer of these non-exclusive products and eventually
again exhibits negative correlation in (; v) space.
We also solve for a social planners optimal product range in Section 5 and compare
it with what the intermediary chooses. The intermediary distorts consumerspurchases,
because it forces them to buy a bundle of products including some low-v products which
they ordinarily would not search for. On the other hand, consumers search too little from
a welfare perspective, because they only account for their own surplus and ignore the
prot earned by rms. We show that under weak conditions the social planner nds it
optimal to have an intermediary. However the intermediary tends to stock more products
than the social planner would like, and often too many of them are stocked exclusively.
Finally in Section 6 we discuss two issues. One issue is how to generate our (; v)
space and how to interpret di¤erent points within it. For instance, we argue that prod-
ucts with large and elastic/convex demands tend to have relatively high v and low  and
so are stocked exclusively to attract consumers, whereas products with large and inelas-
tic/concave demands tend to have relatively low v and high  and so are used by the
intermediary as prot generators. Another issue we consider is upstream competition,
which we do by assuming that each product has two manufacturers. Upstream com-
petition does not qualitatively change the optimal product selection, but it reduces the
intermediarys cost of buying products from manufacturers and so greatly improves its
prot.
1.1 Related literature
There is already a substantial body of literature on intermediaries (see e.g. Spulber
(1999)). An intermediary may exist because it improves the search e¢ ciency between
buyers and sellers (e.g. Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1987), Gehrig (1993), and Spulber
(1996)), or because it acts as an expert or certier that mitigates the asymmetric infor-
5
mation problem between buyers and sellers (e.g. Biglaiser (1993), and Lizzeri (1999)).5
We also study intermediaries in an environment with search frictions, but in our model an
intermediary can protably exist in the market even if it does not improve search e¢ ciency.
This relies on consumers demanding multiple di¤erent products, and this multiproduct
feature distinguishes our model from existing work on intermediaries.
The mechanism by which an intermediary makes prot by stocking negatively corre-
lated products in the (; v) space is reminiscent of bundling (e.g. Stigler (1968), Adams
and Yellen (1976), McAfee, McMillan, and Whinston (1989), and Chen and Riordan
(2013)). By stocking some products that consumers value highly, the intermediary forces
consumers to visit and buy other low-value (but fairly protable) products as well which
consumers would otherwise not buy.6 However in bundling models the rm often needs
to adjust its prices after bundling to extract more consumer surplus and make bundling
protable. In our model a products price remains the same no matter who sells it. More
importantly our paper focuses on product selection, and so is more related to the question
of which products a rm should bundle (however this question is rarely discussed in the
bundling literature). In a totally di¤erent context about information design, Rayo and
Segal (2010) use this same bundling argument to show that an information provider often
prefers partial information disclosure in the sense of pooling two negatively correlated
prospects into one signal. They consider a discrete framework, and more importantly
their information provider can send multiple signals (which would be like the case where
our intermediary could organize and sell non-overlapping products in multiple stores).7
This makes the optimization problem in our paper very di¤erent from theirs. In addition
many other features of our model such as the investigation of non-exclusivity vs exclu-
sivity arrangements, the economies of search, and the stocking space constraint, have no
counterparts in either the bundling literature or the above information design paper.
Our paper is also related to the growing literature on multiproduct search (e.g. McAfee
5In the context of retailers, other possible reasons for retailers to exist include that they may know
more about consumer demand compared to manufacturers, they can internalize pricing externalities when
products are complements or substitutes, or they may be more e¢ cient in marketing activities due to
economies of scale.
6Bundling models need consumers with heterogeneous valuations for each product. In our model
consumers have the same valuation for a product but they di¤er in their search costs, so their net
valuation after taking into account the search cost is actually heterogeneous.
7Alternatively, if any subset of manufacturers could merge and use the same technology as the in-
termediary to sell their products together, the problem would then be more similar to Rayo and Segal
(2010)s.
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(1995), Zhou (2014), Rhodes (2015), and Kaplan et al. (2016)). Existing papers usually
investigate how multiproduct consumer search a¤ects multiproduct retailerspricing de-
cisions when their product range is exogenously given. Our paper departs from this
literature by focusing on product selection, another important decision for multiproduct
retailers. Moreover our paper introduces manufacturers and so explicitly models the ver-
tical structure of the retail market. In this sense it is also related to recent research on
consumer search in vertical markets such as Janssen and Shelegia (2015), and Asker and
Bar-Isaac (2016), though those works consider single-product search and address totally
di¤erent economic questions.
Finally, this paper is related to the research on product assortment planning in op-
eration research and marketing (see, e.g., the survey by Kök et al. (2015)). But that
literature focuses on the optimal variety selection for a certain product when consumers
have single-product demand. Our paper instead focuses on a retailers optimal prod-
uct range choice when consumers have multiproduct demand. We study this issue with
explicit upstream manufacturers and consumer shopping frictions, neither of which is
considered in the above mentioned literature.8
2 The Model
There is a continuum of manufacturers with measure one, and each produces a di¤erent
product. Manufacturer i has a constant marginal cost ci  0. There is also a unit mass of
consumers, who are interested in buying every product. The products are independent,
such that each consumer wishes to buy Qi(pi) units of product i when its price is pi.
When a consumer buys multiple products, her surplus is additive over these products.
We assume that Qi(pi) is downward-sloping and well-behaved such that (pi   ci)Qi(pi)
is single-peaked at the monopoly price pmi . Per-consumer monopoly prot and consumer
surplus from product i are respectively denoted by
i  (pmi   ci)Qi(pmi ) and vi 
Z 1
pmi
Qi(p)dp . (1)
8In this aspect Bronnenberg (2017) is closer to our paper. He studies a free-entry model in a circular
city with both manufacturers and retailers. Consumers have preferences for variety but shopping for
variety is costly, so retailers can save consumers shopping costs by carrying multiple varieties. Bronnen-
bergs model is otherwise very di¤erent from ours and also focuses on di¤erent economic questions. In
particular all varieties in his model are symmetric, so there is no meaningful way to study the composition
of product selection which, however, is the focus of our paper.
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Manufacturers can sell their products directly to consumers, for example via their own
retail outlets (see below for an alternative interpretation). In addition there is a single
intermediary, which can buy products from manufacturers and resell them to consumers.
The intermediary has no resale cost, but can stock at most a measure m  1 of the
products (which we call a hard constraint). An individual product can therefore be
sold to consumers in one of three di¤erent ways: i) only by the manufacturer, ii) only
by the intermediary, or iii) by both the intermediary and its manufacturer. We assume
that the intermediary has all the bargaining power, and simultaneously makes take-it-or-
leave-it o¤ers to each manufacturer whose product it wishes to stock.9 These o¤ers can be
either exclusive(meaning that only the intermediary can sell the product to consumers)
or non-exclusive (meaning that both the intermediary and the relevant manufacturer
can sell the product to consumers). In both cases we suppose that the intermediary
o¤ers two-part tari¤s, consisting of a wholesale unit price  i and a lump-sum fee Ti. The
intermediary also informs manufacturers about which products it intends to stock, and
whether it intends to stock them exclusively or non-exclusively.10 Manufacturers then
simultaneously decide whether or not to accept their o¤er.
Consumers know where each product is available, but do not observe ( i; Ti) in any
contract between a manufacturer and the intermediary. In addition, consumers cannot ob-
serve a rms price(s) or buy its product(s) without incurring a search cost.11 Consumers
di¤er in terms of their typeor unit search cost s, which is distributed in the population
according to a cumulative distribution function F (s) with support (0; s]. Suppose that
the corresponding density function f(s) is everywhere di¤erentiable, strictly positive, and
uniformly bounded with maxs f(s) <1. One interpretation is that s is the opportunity
cost of spending a unit time in shopping. If a consumer of type s visits a measure n of
manufacturers, she incurs an aggregate search cost n  s.12 If the same consumer also
visits the intermediary, and the intermediary stocks a measure m of products, she incurs
9Our results do not change qualitatively if instead the intermediary and manufacturer share any prots
that are earned from sales of the latters product.
10This assumption aims to capture the idea that in practice negotiations evolve over time, such that
manufacturers can (roughly) observe what other products the intermediary stocks.
11Our assumptions here try to capture the idea that a retailers product range is usually reasonably
steady over time, whilst its prices uctuate more frequently for example due to cost or demand shocks.
12Here we implicitly assume that visiting each manufacturer is equally costly. More generally, the cost
of visiting di¤erent manufacturers may be di¤erent, and our framework can be extended to deal with
that case. One possible way to do that is to use (; v; ) to characterize each product where  captures
the amount of time needed to visit a manufacturer.
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an additional search cost of h(m)  s.13 Once a consumer has searched a rm, she can
recall its o¤er costlessly.
We assume that the function h (m) is positive and weakly increasing, reecting the
idea that larger stores may take longer to navigate,14 and may also be located further
out of town. (However notice that the case of h(m) being a constant and so independent
of the measure of stocked products is also allowed.) When h (m) < m we say that the
intermediary generates economies of search, and when h (m) > m we say that it generates
diseconomies of search. When h(m) is strictly increasing, the intermediary faces another
soft constraint because as it stocks more products it becomes costlier for consumers
to visit it. As we will see later on, when h(m) increases fast enough this will cause the
intermediary to voluntarily restrict its size even if its hard stocking space constraint is
not binding.
Finally, the timing of the game is as follows. At the rst stage, the intermediary
simultaneously makes o¤ers to manufacturers whose product it would like to stock. An
o¤er species ( i; Ti) and whether the intermediary will sell the product exclusively or not.
The manufacturers then simultaneously accept or reject. At the second stage, all rms
that sell to consumers choose a retail price for each of their products. Both manufacturers
and the intermediary are assumed to use linear pricing. At the third stage, consumers
observe who sells what and form (rational) expectations about all retail prices. They then
search sequentially among rms and make their purchases. We assume that if consumers
observe an unexpected price at some rm, they hold passive beliefs about the retail prices
they have not yet discovered.
2.1 Preliminary analysis
Our aim is to study which products a prot-maximizing intermediary should choose to
stock, and whether or not it should sell them exclusively. However it is instructive to
rst briey consider what would happen if there were no intermediary. In this case, the
only equilibrium in which each product market is active has each manufacturer selling
its product at the monopoly price. This follows from standard arguments concerning the
hold-up problem in search models with only one rm (see, e.g., Stiglitz, 1979, and An-
derson and Renault, 2006). In particular, since consumers only observe a manufacturers
13Considering a more general search cost function h(m; s) would make our model less tractable but
would not change the main insights.
14However we do not explicitly model in-store shopping process, since this would require us to analyze
not only which products the intermediary stocks but also how it displays them to consumers.
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price after incurring the search cost, their decision of whether to search a manufacturer
depends only on the expected price there. Once a consumer arrives at the manufacturer,
the search cost is already sunk and so the manufacturer optimally charges its monopoly
price. Hence consumers should rationally expect monopoly pricing.15 Therefore recall-
ing the notation introduced in (1), in equilibrium manufacturer i is searched only by
consumers with s  vi, and so it earns a prot iF (vi).
It turns out that we have a similar simple pricing outcome when the intermediary is
active. (All omitted proofs can be found in the appendix.)
Lemma 1 (i) In any equilibrium where each product market is active, each seller of a
product charges consumers the relevant monopoly price.
(ii) If product i is stocked exclusively by the intermediary, the intermediary o¤ers the
manufacturer ( i = ci; Ti = iF (vi)). If product i is stocked non-exclusively by the inter-
mediary, in terms of studying the optimal product range, it is without loss of generality
to focus on the contracting outcome where the intermediary o¤ers ( i = ci; Ti) to manu-
facturer i, such that the manufacturers total payo¤ is iF (vi).
To understand the intuition behind Lemma 1, recall from earlier that a product can
be sold in three di¤erent ways. Firstly product i may be sold only by its manufacturer.
The logic for why the manufacturer charges its monopoly price pmi is exactly the same
as in the case of no intermediary. The intermediary then earns iF (vi), which forms its
outside option if it receives an o¤er from the intermediary. Secondly product imay be sold
exclusively by the intermediary. Since consumers do not observe the price before searching,
the same hold-up argument implies that if the intermediary faces a wholesale price  i, it
will charge the corresponding monopoly price argmax (p   i)Qi (p). Notice that joint
prot earned on product i is maximized when the intermediary charges the monopoly
price pmi , therefore in order to induce this outcome the intermediary proposes  i = ci
i.e. a bilaterally e¢ cient two-part tari¤. The intermediary then drives the manufacturer
down to its outside option by o¤ering it a lump-sum payment Ti = iF (vi). Thirdly
product i may be sold by both its manufacturer and the intermediary. The analysis here
is more complex. However the main idea is that the intermediary again avoids double-
marginalization by proposing a contract with  i = ci, whilst search frictions eliminate
price competition between the manufacturer and intermediary. In particular, following
15As is usual in search models, there also exist other equilibria in which consumers do not search (some)
manufacturers because they are expected to charge very high prices, and given no consumers search these
high prices can be trivially sustained. We do not consider these uninteresting equilibria in this paper.
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Diamonds (1971) paradox if consumers expect both sellers to charge the same price for
product i, they will search at most one of them and hence each nds it optimal to charge
the monopoly price. The manufacturer is compensated for any sales that it loses in signing
the contract by way of a lump-sum transfer.
Given Lemma 1, it is convenient to index products by their per-consumer monopoly
prot and consumer surplus as dened in (1) (rather than by their demand curve Qi (pi)).
Therefore let 
  R2+ be a two-dimensional product space (; v), and suppose it is com-
pact and convex. Let v  0 and v <1 be the lower and the upper bound of v. For each
v 2 [v; v], there exist (v)  (v) < 1 such that  2 [(v); (v)]. (In section 6.1 we
provide examples of demand functions which can generate this type of product space.)
Let (
;F ; G) be a probability measure space where F is a -eld which is the set of
all measurable subsets of 
 according to measure G. (In particular, G(
) = 1.) When
there is no confusion, we also use G to denote the joint distribution function of (; v),
and let g be the corresponding joint density function. We assume that g is di¤erentiable
and strictly positive everywhere. If a consumer buys a set A 2 F of products at their
monopoly prices, she obtains surplus
R
A
vdG before taking into account the search cost.
To avoid trivial corner solutions, we also assume that v  s.
Discussion. Before we start solving for optimal product range, we discuss some of our
modeling assumptions and their implications.
(i) A continuum of products. Considering a continuum of products is mainly for
analytical convenience. A model with a discrete number of products f(i; vi)gi=1;:::;n
would yield qualitatively similar insights but be messier to solve because the optimization
problem would become a combinatorial one. (See footnote 22 later for the details. The
case with only two products is easy to deal with, but is not rich enough to study the
optimal product range choice in a meaningful way.)
(ii) Homogeneous consumer demand. Consumers are assumed to have demand for all
products. In reality a consumer usually only buys a small fraction of the products available
in a store, and some consumers want to buy more products than others (or similarly
some products are needed more often than others). Our framework can be modied to
capture this consumer demand heterogeneity,16 but it becomes less tractable because two
consumers with the same s can have very di¤erent search patterns. On the other hand, we
will show later that consumers with a lower search cost are more willing to shop around
16One possible way is to characterize each product by (; v; ) where  2 [0; 1] is the probability that
product (; v) is needed by a consumer.
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and buy more products. In this sense we have already allowed demand heterogeneity:
consumers with a low/high search cost can be regarded as high/low-demand consumers.
(iii) Direct sales from manufacturers to consumers. Manufacturers are assumed to be
able to sell direct to consumers. However nothing changes if instead the manufacturer faces
a choice between selling via an independent single-product (specialist) or a multiproduct
(generalist) retailer, or both. In particular consider the following modication of our
set-up. Suppose that rst the intermediary makes o¤ers to manufacturers, who each
accept or reject. Manufacturers are unable to sell direct to consumers. However second,
if the manufacturer is not forbidden from doing so, it can make an o¤er to a relevant
specialist retailer whose only option is to stock its product. As in Lemma 1, we can
prove that equilibrium contracts are such that all sellers charge the relevant monopoly
price, and the manufacturer fully extracts the single-product retailer. Consequently each
manufacturers prot is the same as it would earn if it could sell directly to consumers.
Hence the intermediarys optimal product selection will be the same as in our main model.
(iv) Lemma 1 and monopoly pricing. The monopoly pricing outcome described in
Lemma 1 enables us to represent products using (; v) space, and hence study product
range choice in a tractable way. However notice that monopoly pricing is not important
per se - what really matters for our analysis is that the retail price of each product remains
the same irrespective of where it is sold. Of course in practice prices usually di¤er across
retail outlets, and a large literature already explores this. Our model abstracts from such
price dispersion in order to make progress in understanding optimal product choice.
3 A Simple Case
We now turn to study the intermediarys optimal product range choice. We start with a
special case where i) the intermediary can only o¤er exclusive contracts, ii) h (m) = m
such that the cost of visiting the intermediary is the same as it would have cost to visit
the manufacturers whose products it sells (i.e. no economies of scale in search), and iii)
there is no stocking space limit (i.e. m = 1). This relatively simple case is not meant
to be realistic, but it helps to illustrate some of the economic forces inuencing optimal
product selection.
We rst solve for a consumers decision of whether or not to search the intermediary.
Suppose the intermediary sells a positive measure of products A 2 F . A consumer can
cherry-pick from the products not stocked by the intermediary (i.e. she will search any
product i 62 A if and only if s  vi), but she cannot cherry-pick from amongst the
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intermediarys products  she must either search all or none of them. Therefore if a
consumer visits the intermediary she incurs an additional search cost s
R
A
dG, but also
expects to receive additional utility
R
A
vdG since she will buy all products available there.
Consequently a consumer visits the intermediary if and only if s  k, where
k =
R
A
vdGR
A
dG
(2)
is the average consumer surplus amongst the products sold at the intermediary. (Note that
the order in which the consumer searches through the intermediary and manufacturers
does not matter.)
The intermediarys problem is then
max
A2F
Z
A
 [F (k)  F (v)] dG ; (3)
with k dened in (2).17 In particular the intermediary earns a net prot  [F (k)  F (v)]
from product (; v) if it stocks it. This is explained as follows. The intermediary attracts
a mass of consumers F (k), and so earns variable prot F (k). However from Lemma 1
the intermediary must also compensate the relevant manufacturer with a lump-sum trans-
fer F (v). The following simple observation will play an important role in subsequent
analysis: among the products stocked by the intermediary, those with v < k generate a
prot while those with v > k generate a loss. Intuitively a product with v < k generates
relatively few sales when sold by its manufacturer, since consumers anticipate receiving
only a low surplus. When the same product is sold by the intermediary its sales increase,
because more consumers search the intermediary (given its higher expected surplus k).
The opposite is true for a product with v > k, i.e. its demand is shrunk when sold through
the intermediary.18
The following lemma is a useful rst step in characterizing the intermediarys optimal
product range.
Lemma 2 The intermediary makes a strictly positive prot. It sells a strictly positive
measure of products but not all products (i.e.
R
A
dG 2 (0; 1)).
17Note that when
R
A
dG = 0 the intermediarys prot is zero and it does not matter how we specify
k. Some of our later analysis will consider limit cases where the measure of A goes to zero, and in those
cases k will be well-dened via Lhopitals rule.
18Notice that the same will be true for a general h(m) if it increases in m fast enough. But if h(m)
is close to be constant and is su¢ ciently small, then k can be greater than any v in A. As we will see
in Section 4, in the latter case the characterization of the optimal product selection will be signicantly
di¤erent and the problem will be more interesting with the hard stocking space constraint.
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The intermediary earns strictly positive prot even though its search technology is no
more e¢ cient than that of the manufacturers whose products it resells.19 To understand
why, recall that the intermediary always makes a gain on some products and a loss on
others, and that these gains and losses are proportional to a products per-customer
protability . Now imagine that the intermediary selects its loss-making products from
amongst those with low , and selects its prot-making products from those with high .
This strategy seeks to minimize losses on the former, and maximize gains on the latter,
and so might be expected to generate a net positive prot. In the proof we show by
construction that there is always some set A where this logic is correct. On the other
hand, even with no stocking space constraint, the intermediary does not stock all products.
In the proof we show that starting from stocking all products, the intermediary can always
do strictly better by excluding some loss-making products with high  together with some
prot-generating products with low .
We now solve explicitly for the optimal set of products stocked by the intermediary.
Instead of working directly with areas in 
, it is more convenient to introduce a stocking
policy function q (; v) 2 f0; 1g. Then stocking products in a set A 2 F is equivalent to
adopting a measurable stocking policy function q(; v) = 1 if and only if (; v) 2 A. The
intermediarys problem then becomes
max
q(;v)2f0;1g
Z


q(; v)[F (k)  F (v)]dG ;
where the average consumer surplus k o¤ered by the intermediary solvesZ


q(; v) (v   k) dG = 0 : (4)
This is an optimization of functionals. It can be shown that this optimization problem
has a solution, and the optimal solution can be derived by treating (4) as a constraint
and using the following Lagrange method.
The Lagrangian function is
L =
Z


q(; v)[(F (k)  F (v)) + (v   k)]dG ; (5)
where  is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the constraint (4). The rst term
(F (k)   F (v)) is the direct e¤ect on prot of stocking product (; v), and the second
term (v   k) reects the indirect e¤ect from the inuence on consumer search behavior
19By continuity the same can be true even if the intermediarys search technology is less e¢ cient than
the manufacturers.
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(where  > 0 as we will see below). For the products with v < k, their direct e¤ect is
positive as we explained before, while their indirect e¤ect is negative since stocking them
reduces the average consumer surplus of the products in the intermediary. The opposite
is true for the products with v > k. Since the integrand in (5) is linear in q, the optimal
stocking policy is as follows:
q(; v) =
(
1 if (F (k)  F (v)) + (v   k) > 0
0 otherwise
:
For given k and , we let I(k; ) denote the set of (; v) for which q(; v) = 1. It
consists of the following two regions:
v < k and    k   v
F (k)  F (v) ; (6)
and
v > k and    k   v
F (k)  F (v) : (7)
(Notice that it is indi¤erent whether or not to stock products with v = k.)
Graphically we can divide 
 space into four quadrants, using a vertical locus v = k and
a horizontal locus  = (k v)
F (k) F (v) (which is continuous in v, including at the point v = k).
Then the intermediarys optimal product selection consists of two negatively correlated
regions in (; v) space. The intermediary stocks products in the bottom-right quadrant
with high v and low : since products with v > k make a loss, the intermediary chooses
those with the lowest possible . These products are stocked to attract consumers to
search the intermediary. The intermediary also stocks products in the top-left quadrant
with low v and high : since products with v < k make a prot, the intermediary chooses
those with the highest possible . The products in the other regions are not stocked:
those with low v and low  would generate little direct prot whilst dissuade consumers
from searching, and those with high v and high  are too expensive to buy from their
manufacturers.
It then remains to determine k and . Firstly, at the optimum we must have F (k) 2
(0; 1). To see why, note that Lemma 2 implies that I(k; ) must have a strictly positive
measure, and therefore by the denition of k it must be true that k 2 (v; v). Moreover
by assumption [v; v]  [0; s] and so it follows that F (k) 2 (0; 1). Since k is interior, we
can take the rst-order condition of (5) with respect to k, and obtainZ
I(k;)
(f(k)   )dG = 0 ; (8)
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whereupon we observe that  > 0.20 Secondly, we have the original constraint (4), which
we can rewrite as Z
I(k;)
(v   k)dG = 0 : (9)
We therefore have a system of two equations (8) and (9) in two unknowns.21
The following result summarizes the above analysis:22
Proposition 1 The intermediary optimally stocks products in the regions of (6) and (7),
where k 2 (v; v) and  > 0 jointly solve equations (8) and (9).
To illustrate, consider a uniform product space with 
 = [0; 1]2 and G(; v) = v.
If F (s) = s on [0; 1], one can check that in the optimal solution the product space is
divided by v = k and  =  with k =  = 1
2
. If F (s) =
p
s on [0; 1], one can check
that in the optimal solution the product space is divided by v = k and  = (
p
k +
p
v)
with k  0:4876 and   0:3515. The shaded areas in Figure 1 below depict the optimal
product range in these two examples. In the rst example the intermediary makes prot
1
32
and improves industry prot by 12:5% relative to the case of no intermediary, and
in the second example the intermediary makes prot about 0:036 and improves industry
prot by about 10:8%.
In this simple case it is clear that without improving search e¢ ciency, the intermediary
must harm consumers by restricting their opportunities to cherry-pick from all products.
However, total welfare (which is the sum of industry prot and consumer surplus) could
be improved. In fact, this is the case in both of the above examples: the intermediary
improves total welfare by about 2:5% and 2:8%, respectively. This is because consumers
search too little and buy too few products in the case of no intermediary: they search and
20(8) implies that  equals f(k) times the average prot of the products stocked by the intermediary.
Intuitively  captures the impact on prot of a small decrease in k, and k can be decreased either by
removing some loss-making products with high v, or adding some protable products with low v.
21If the system has multiple solutions, the solution that generates the highest prot is the optimal one.
22If we consider a discrete number of products f(i; vi)gi=1;:::;n, the intermediarys problem becomes
max
qi2f0;1g
X
i
qii[F (k)  F (vi)]
with k =
P
i qivi=
P
i qi. This is a combinatorial optimization problem. Given the number of possible
stocking policies, 2n, is very large even for dozens of products, this problem is usually not easy to solve.
One approach is to make the problem smooth by allowing stochastic stocking policies with qi 2 [0; 1].
Then we can use the Lagrange method and will have bang-bang solutions. The additional complication
is how to solve the two equations of k and  usually depends in a messy way on the locations of the
products in the discrete product space.
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buy product (; v) only if s < v, but from the perspective of total welfare they should
search and buy if s <  + v. The intermediary forces consumers with s < k to buy some
low-v but high- products which they would not buy otherwise. We will study the socially
optimal product selection in Section 5.
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Figure 1: Optimal product range: the simple case
Finally we briey discuss how the shape of the search cost distribution F (s) inuences
the optimal product range. Observe from Proposition 1 that the horizontal locus  =
 (k   v) = [F (k)  F (v)] increases in v when F (s) is concave (as we have seen in the
above example with F (s) =
p
s) and decreases in v when F (s) is convex. Hence the
intermediarys optimal product range tends to contain more low-v and high-v items when
F (s) is concave, and the opposite when F (s) is convex. To understand why, consider
the case of a concave F (s). Notice that the compensation paid by the intermediary
to the manufacturer is F (v), which grows relatively sharply in v when v is low, but
grows relatively slowly in v when v is large. Hence it makes sense for the intermediary to
mainly stock products with very low v (where the extremely low compensation outweighs
the negative e¤ect on consumer search) and very high v (where the small additional
compensation is outweighed by the benecial e¤ects of increased consumer search).
4 The General Case
We now return to the general case: the intermediary has a stocking space of size m and
can o¤er both exclusive and non-exclusive contracts, and the search cost of visiting the
intermediary of size m is h (m)  s, where h(m) is weakly increasing. Let q(; v) =
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(qE(; v); qNE(; v)) be the stocking policy function, where qE(; v) 2 f0; 1g indicates
whether product (; v) is stocked exclusively or not, and qNE(; v) 2 f0; 1g indicates
whether product (; v) is stocked non-exclusively or not. Note that for each product
(; v), at most one of qE(; v) and qNE(; v) can be 1, but it is possible that both are 0
(which happens when the intermediary does not stock product (; v)). Then
q(; v)  qE(; v) + qNE(; v)
indicates whether product (; v) is stocked or not as before. Using the notation q(; v)
is more convenient whenever the exclusivity arrangement does not matter. Henceforth
whenever there is no confusion we will suppress the arguments (; v) in the stocking policy
function.
Let us rst investigate a consumers optimal search rule. Given all products are always
sold at their monopoly prices, if a consumer decides to visit the intermediary, she will buy
all the products available there regardless of whether they are exclusive or not, and will
only buy those products not stocked there from the relevant independent manufacturers if
v > s. (In other words, no consumer will search the same product twice.) Also notice that
the order in which the consumer visits the various manufacturers and the intermediary
does not matter. Therefore, if a consumer of type s chooses to visit the intermediary, her
surplus is
u1 (s;q) =
Z
qvdG  h
Z
qdG

s+
Z
v>s
(1  q) (v   s) dG ; (10)
where the rst two terms are the surplus from visiting the intermediary and the nal term
is the surplus from products not available at the intermediary. Notice that exclusivity
arrangement does not matter for consumer surplus in this case.
If a consumer of type s does not visit the intermediary, she will buy all products with
v > s available in manufacturers (i.e. not stocked exclusively by the intermediary). Thus
her surplus is
u0 (s;q) =
Z
v>s
(1  qE) (v   s) dG : (11)
Observe that as the intermediary stocks more products exclusively i.e. as qE takes value
1 for more products, visiting the intermediary becomes relatively more attractive. This
suggests that even though the intermediary can now o¤er non-exclusive contracts, it may
still use (more expensive) exclusive contracts in order to attract more consumers.
To ease the exposition, we introduce the following tie-break rule: consumers visit the
intermediary only if doing so strictly increases their payo¤. As we show in the appendix,
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the di¤erence between (10) and (11) is non-negative at s = 0 and weakly concave in s.
Then we obtain the following cut-o¤ search rule.
Lemma 3 Consumers search the intermediary if and only if s < k, where
(i) k = 0 (nobody searches the intermediary) if
R
qEdG = 0 and
R
qdG  h  R qdG.
(ii) k > s (everybody searches the intermediary) if
R
qvdG > h
 R
qdG

s.
(iii) k 2 (0; s] otherwise and is the solution to
k =
R
v<k
qvdG+
R
v>k
qEvdG
h(
R
qdG)  R
v>k
qNEdG
: (12)
In this case k < v if and only if
R
qvdG < h
 R
qdG

v.
According to part (i) of the lemma, no consumer visits the intermediary when all
its products are non-exclusive and it generates diseconomies of search. This is simply
because consumers can then acquire all of the intermediarys products elsewhere at a
lower cost. On the other hand, part (ii) shows that all consumers visit the intermediary
when it generates su¢ ciently strong economies of search. Finally, part (iii) shows that in
other cases consumers follow a cut-o¤ strategy, and search the intermediary provided their
search cost is su¢ ciently low. Intuitively, in our model a consumer with a lower search
cost is a high-demand consumer who is willing to buy more products, so has a higher
incentive to visit the intermediary.23 ;24 Notice that in (iii) the non-exclusive products
with v > k a¤ect consumer search behavior only by their mass but not by their values.
This is because the only impact on consumers of buying them in the intermediary is
the change of the search cost associated with them relative to directly buying from their
manufacturers. We highlight the condition for k < v because if the search economies are
su¢ ciently strong so that the opposite is true, the demand for any product sold by the
intermediary will be greater than when it is sold directly by its manufacturer, so there
will be no loss-making products.
Given the consumer search rule in Lemma 3 and the result of monopoly pricing from
Lemma 1, the intermediarys prot, when it chooses a stocking policy q, is
(q) =
Z
v<k
q[F (k)  F (v)]dG+
Z
v>k
qE[F (k)  F (v)]dG : (13)
23More precisely, the advantage of shopping at the intermediary is that it stocks some products exclu-
sively and/or has a better search technology, while the disadvantage is that consumers may buy some
products with low v which ordinarily would not interest them. However consumers with low s would like
to buy most products anyway, and so the latter disadvantage is small.
24This is consistent with the recent trend that more small local grocery stores are opened up to cater
for consumers who only need a small basket of products and have no time to travel to big stores.
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For a product with v < k, the prot from it is independent of its exclusivity (i.e.,
only q = qE+ qNE matters). This is because even under non-exclusivity the manufacturer
makes zero sales, since consumers with s < k buy from the intermediary, and consumers
with s  k nd it too costly to search a manufacturer with v < k. Hence the intermediary
always earns revenue F (k) and must pay the manufacturer the full prot F (v) that it
would earn if it rejected the o¤er. This explains the rst term. The second term in (13)
is prot earned on exclusive products with v > k. This takes the same form as in the
previous section, and these products are stocked at a loss to drive store tra¢ c. Note that
this second term exists only if k < v.
Finally, and most interestingly, products with v > k which are stocked non-exclusively
do not appear in equation (13), because they generate zero prot for the intermediary.
The reason is that consumers with s < k buy the product from the intermediary, whilst
consumers with s 2 (k; v) buy it directly from the manufacturer. Hence, to make up the
manufacturers lost revenue the intermediary only needs to compensate the manufacturer
by F (k), which is exactly the revenue that it earns from such a product. Although these
products generate no direct revenue for the intermediary for a given k, they can inuence
consumerssearch behavior via k and so indirectly a¤ect the intermediarys prot. As a
result, the intermediary may still have an incentive to stock them.
The following lemma gives some su¢ cient conditions for the intermediary to make a
prot.
Lemma 4 The intermediary will always stock a strictly positive measure of products and
earn a strictly positive prot if h(m) = m for all m 2 [0; m] or if h(m) < m for some
m 2 (0; m].
When the intermediary does not improve search e¢ ciency, it can make a prot by
stocking some products exclusively as in the simple case. When it improves search ef-
ciency for some m, it can make a prot at least by stocking a measure m of products
non-exclusively, though as we will see below using non-exclusive contracts only is usually
not the optimal stocking policy unless m is su¢ ciently large and economies of search are
su¢ ciently strong.
In the following, we characterize the optimal product selection. The analysis turns out
to be more transparent if we start with the case with no stocking space limit (i.e. m = 1).
We will investigate the case of m < 1 afterwards. Henceforth, we assume h0(m) 2 [0; 1],
i.e., there are (weakly) economies of scale in searching the intermediary when it expands
marginally.
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4.1 Unlimited stocking space
When the intermediary has no limit on how many products it can stock, the following
lemma gives a rst qualitative description of what the optimal product range looks like:
Lemma 5 When the intermediary optimally stocks a positive measure of products and
consumers adopt a search rule with threshold k, (a) all products with v > k (if any)
must be stocked, and for each v > k there exists +(v) such that product (; v) is stocked
exclusively if and only if   +(v); (b) among the products with v < k (if any), for each
v < k there exists  (v) such that product (; v) is stocked if and only if    (v).
An important di¤erence relative to the simple case in Section 3 is that now the in-
termediary will optimally stock all products with v > k. Suppose to the contrary that
some positive measure set of products B with v > k are not stocked. Then we show in
the proof that stocking all products in B non-exclusively is a protable deviation. As we
saw earlier the intermediary earns zero prot from these products, but they induce more
consumers (i.e., those with s slightly above k) to visit the intermediary since h0 (m)  1
implies that searching the products in B in the intermediary saves them search costs.25
Once they visit the intermediary, they also buy other products available there which are
on average protable.
Nevertheless similar to the simple case, products with v > k that are stocked exclu-
sively make a loss, and so are chosen to have the lowest  possible in order to minimize
that loss. Moreover, and again similar to the simple case, products with v < k make
positive prot, and so are chosen to have the highest  possible in order to maximize
these prots.
We now characterize the details of the optimal product range. The intermediarys
problem is to maximize (13), where k is given in Lemma 3. It is more convenient to
introduce another parameter m =
R
qdG, i.e., the measure of all products stocked by the
intermediary. In this general case, corner solutions with m 2 f0; 1g or k 2 f0; sg can
arise. In the following, we will focus on the case where the intermediary makes a strictly
positive prot in the optimal solution (so m > 0 and k > 0), and not all consumers visit
it (so k < s). Lemma 4 has provided simple su¢ cient conditions for the former, and
according to Lemma 3 a simple su¢ cient condition for the latter is
R
qvdG=h(
R
qdG) < s
25Note that in the knife-edge case where h0 (m) = 1 the intermediary is indi¤erent in stocking products
in B, since doing so does not change the search cost of marginal consumers, and so has no e¤ect on the
store tra¢ c.
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for any q, which is equivalent to maxx
R v
x
vdG=h(
R v
x
dG) < s.26
Now the intermediarys problem is to maximize (13) subject to (12). It is more con-
venient to treat m =
R
qdG as another constraint. (This may become a real constraint
when we introduce a limited stocking space in next subsection.) Notice that (12) can be
rewritten as Z
v<k
qvdG+
Z
v>k
(qEv + qNEk)dG  h(m)k = 0 : (14)
Then the Lagrangian function of the problem is
L =
Z
v<k
q [F (k)  F (v)] dG+
Z
v>k
qE [F (k)  F (v)] dG
+
Z
v<k
qvdG+
Z
v>k
(qEv + qNEk)dG  h(m)k

+ 

m 
Z
v<k
qdG 
Z
v>k
qdG

;
where  is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the constraint (14), and  is the
multiplier associated with the constraint m =
R
qdG.27 The intermediary maximizes L
by choosing q, k and m.
It is useful to rewrite the Lagrange function as
L =
Z
v<k
q[(F (k)  F (v)) + v   ]dG
+
Z
v>k
(qE[(F (k)  F (v)) + v   ] + qNE(k   ))dG  kh(m) + m : (15)
This can be explained similarly as in the simple case by using the direct and indirect
e¤ect of stocking a product. In particular, v   reects the indirect e¤ect on consumer
search incentive of stocking a product with v < k or exclusively stocking a product
with v > k, and k    reects a similar e¤ect of stocking a product with v > k non-
exclusively. As we show in the proof of the following proposition,  = kh0(m)  k given
h0(m)  1. Therefore, unsurprisingly stocking a product with v > k (regardless of its
exclusivity) always increases consumersincentive to visit the intermediary. If h0(m) < 1,
even stocking a product with v slightly below k increases consumer search incentive as
well.
26More precisely,
R v
x
vdG =
R v
x
R (v)
(v)
vg(; v)ddv. The equivalence result is because for any stocking
policy q, 9 x 2 [v; v] such that R qdG = R v
x
dG, and in the same time
R
qvdG  R v
x
vdG since the average
v improves when the product mass is allocated to the products with the highest possible vs.
27If m = 1, then we must have q = 1 everywhere and then the second constraint become redundant
and the  term disappears.
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Proposition 2 In the general case without stocking space limit, suppose the intermediary
makes a strictly positive prot and k 2 (0; s) in the optimal solution (which is true if the
conditions in Lemma 4 hold and maxx
R v
x
vdG=h(
R v
x
dG) < s). Then the optimal product
selection features either
(i) m < 1, and among the products with v < k, only those with
   h
0(m)k   v
F (k)  F (v) (16)
are stocked and it does not matter whether they are stocked exclusively or non-exclusively,
and among the products with v > k (if k < v), those with
   k   v
F (k)  F (v) (17)
are stocked exclusively and the others are stocked non-exclusively. In this case, the para-
meters k, , and m solve the following system of equations:
k =
R
v<k
qvdG+
R
v>k
qEvdG
h(m)  R
v>k
qNEdG
; (18)
 = f(k)
R
v<k
qdG+
R
v>k
qEdG
h(m)  R
v>k
qNEdG
; (19)
m =
Z
qdG ; (20)
or
(ii) m = 1 (i.e., all products are stocked), and among the products with v > k (if k < v),
those with
   k   v
F (k)  F (v)
are stocked exclusively, and it does not matter whether to stock the products with v < k
exclusively or non-exclusively. In this case,  and k solve (18) and (19) with q = 1 and
m = 1.
This characterization is consistent with the qualitative description of the optimal prod-
uct range in Lemma 5. The main qualitatively di¤erence, compared to the simple case
in Section 3, is that the intermediary will stock the products in the top-right corner non-
exclusively (which were excluded when only exclusive contracts are available). Another
di¤erence is, if economies of scale in search is strong enough, the intermediary will stock all
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products.28 A subtler di¤erence is that when h0(m) < 1, h
0(m)k v
F (k) F (v) !  1 when v ! k .
This implies that for those products with v close to but smaller than k, they will always
be stocked regardless of their .
Notice that for the stocked products with v < k, the exclusivity arrangement does
not matter. This is because even if such a product is also available for purchase in its
manufacturer, the consumers who do not visit the intermediary (i.e., those with s > k) will
not bother to visit the manufacturer either given v < s. This makes these products as
if they were sold exclusively by the intermediary even if the contract is not exclusive.
One way to tie-break this indi¤erence is to introduce some small-demand consumers
who never visit the intermediary. In that case, the intermediary will strictly prefer to
stock the products with v < k non-exclusively in order to reduce the compensation to
the manufacturers. (A formal proof is available upon request.) For this reason, in the
following we claim that the products with v < k are stocked non-exclusively.
To illustrate the optimal product selection, consider the uniform example withG(; v) =
v and F (s) = s. Suppose h (m) = +m. Figure 2(a) and 2(b) below depict the optimal
product selection when h(m) = m and h(m) = 0:7m, respectively. (In the rst example
k =  = 1
2
and m = 0:75, and in the second k =   0:826 and m  0:769.) Now the
products in the top-right corner are stocked non-exclusively,29 and as economies of search
improve the intermediary stocks more products overall but fewer exclusive products. With
stronger economies of search the intermediary will rely less on exclusive products to at-
tract consumers to visit.
Figure 2(c) and 2(d) below depict the optimal product selection when h(m) = 0:4 +
0:5m and h(m) = 0:4 + 0:2m, respectively. (According to Lemma 4, the intermediary
can make a positive prot in both examples. In the rst example k =   0:487 and
m  0:964, and in the second k =   0:832 and m  0:985.) Given there is a relatively
large xed component in the search cost, the intermediary needs to stock enough products
to make consumers willing to visit. But similar as in the previous two examples, as
economies of search become stronger it stocks more products overall but fewer exclusive
28A simple su¢ cient condition for m = 1 is
R
vdG=h(1) > s. Under this condition, Lemma 3 implies
that all consumers will visit the intermediary and buy if it stocks all products. This generates the highest
possible industry prot and so also the highest possible intermediary prot. A su¢ cient condition for
m < 1 is:  = v = 0, [0; ]2  
 for a su¢ ciently small  > 0, h(1) < 1, h0(1) > 0 and R vdG=h(1) < s.
(The proof is available upon request.) In general, however, it appears hard to nd a necessary and
su¢ cient primitive condition for m < 1.
29In the rst example with no economies of search the intermediary only has a weak incentive to
non-exclusively stock the products in the top-right corner [0:5; 1]2.
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products. Eventually if  is su¢ ciently close to zero, the intermediary will stock all
products non-exclusively. In such a case, it will be more interesting to investigate the
optimal product selection with a stocking space constraint.30
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(d) h(m) = 0:4 + 0:2m
Figure 2: Optimal product range: the general case with m = 1
4.2 Limited stocking space
We now introduce the stocking space limit m < 1. If the constraint does not bind in the
optimal solution, the characterization of the optimal product range is the same as in part
(i) of Proposition 2. In the following, we focus on the case when the constraint binds in
30Notice that stronger economies of search in visiting the intermediary can also be interpreted as more
costly direct-to-consumer sales. Therefore, our discussion also suggests that when direct-to-consumer
sales becomes easier (e.g., due to the online market), the retailer will become smaller and rely more on
o¤ering exclusive products.
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the optimal solution. Then we have a real constraint m =
R
qdG, but the Lagrangian
function is the same as (15) except that m is replaced by m:
L =
Z
v<k
q[(F (k)  F (v)) + v   ]dG
+
Z
v>k
fqE[(F (k)  F (v)) + v   ] + qNE(k   )g dG  kh( m) +  m : (21)
Note that  is now the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the hard stocking space
constraint.
The following proposition reports the optimal product range in this case:
Proposition 3 In the general case with a limited stocking space m < 1, suppose the
intermediary makes a strictly positive prot and k 2 (0; s) in the optimal solution (which
is true if the conditions in Lemma 4 hold and
R v
x
vdG=h(
R v
x
dG) < s for any x such thatR v
x
dG  m). If the stocking space constraint binds in the optimal solution, then among
the products with v < k, only those with
    v
F (k)  F (v)
are stocked and it does not matter whether they are stocked exclusively or non-exclusively,
and among the products with v > k (if k < v in the optimal solution), the optimal selection
features either
(i) k    > 0 and those with
   k   v
F (k)  F (v)
are stocked exclusively and the others are stocked non-exclusively, or
(ii) k    = 0 and those with
   k   v
F (k)  F (v)
are stocked exclusively and some of the other products are stocked non-exclusively, or
(iii) k    < 0 and only those with
    v
F (k)  F (v)
are stocked exclusively. The parameters k,  and  solve (18)-(20) with m replaced by m.
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From (21), we can see that k    captures the e¤ect on the intermediarys prot of
stocking a product with v > k non-exclusively. Its sign determines whether the inter-
mediary should stock any such products. When k    = 0 in the optimal solution, the
intermediary is indi¤erent in which such products to select as long as the measure of them
is such that k    = 0. As a result, the product selection in this region is not uniquely
pinned down.
It appears hard to nd primitive conditions for the sign of k    in the optimal
solution. But intuitively when the space constraint just starts binding, we have  =
kh0( m) from the previous analysis, and so k    > 0 if h0( m) < 1. If the constraint
is tightened slightly from this point, what products should be removed? They should be
the products with v < k around the boundary (F (k) F (v))+v  = 0 because they
contribute zero to the intermediarys prot while all other stocked products have a strictly
positive contribution. This process continues until k   = 0. Now if the stocking space
limit further shrinks, some non-exclusive products with v > k should be dropped because
they have zero contribution. But they should not be dropped all at once because otherwise
the constraint would be suddenly slack and we would have k    > 0. Therefore, there
should exist a range of m in which k  = 0 and the non-exclusive products with v > k
are removed gradually. Eventually we will reach the stage of k  < 0 and there are no
non-exclusive products with v > k any more. In this stage if m further shrinks, the least
protable products around the boundary (F (k)   F (v)) + v    = 0 (which applies
for both v < k and v > k) should be removed. Notice that when k    < 0, we have
limv!k 
 v
F (k) F (v) = 1 and limv!k+  vF (k) F (v) =  1, so the products with v su¢ ciently
close to k should be excluded regardless of their .31 This intuitive discussion is conrmed
in the numerical examples below.
Consider the running example with uniform product space G(; v) = v. To make it
possible that k > v (which case we have not explored before) but in the same time k < s,
suppose F (s) = s=2, i.e. s is uniformly distributed on [0; 2]. The stocking space constraint
is more likely to bind when economies of search are stronger. So let us consider the polar
case where h0(m) = 0, i.e., h(m) is a constant. Suppose h(m) =  and  > 1
4
[1 (1  m)2]
so that k < s.32 Figure 3 below describes, when  = 0:4, how the optimal product
31Intuitively, for the products with v slightly below k, their demand is only expanded a little via being
sold through the intermediary, and for the products with v slightly above k, they contribute little in
attracting more consumers to visit.
32When the stocking space is m, consumers have the highest incentive to visit the intermediary if
it stocks all the products with v  1   m exclusively. Therefore, if R 1
1  m vdv < s or equivalently
 > 14 [1  (1  m)2] given s = 2, not all consumers will visit the intermediary (i.e. k < s).
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selection varies as m shrinks.
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NE
E
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
v
pi
(b) m = 0:5
NE
E
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
v
pi
(c) m = 0:46
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(d) m = 0:3
Figure 3: Optimal product range: the general case with m < 1 and h(m) = 0:4
When m is greater than about 0:65, k > 1 and so there is no region of v > k. In
this case the demand for any stocked product is expanded compared to direct sales, and
so there are no loss-making products. When m is between about 0:65 and about 0:463,
k < 1 and so the region of v > k appears. In the same time, k  > 0 and so result (i) in
Proposition 3 applies: all the products in the region of v > k are stocked, but only those
with relatively low  are stocked exclusively. This is qualitatively similar to Figure 2 when
there is no stocking space limit but economies of search are relatively weak. When m is
between about 0:463 and about 0:454, k < 1 and k   = 0, so result (ii) in Proposition
3 applies: some non-exclusive products in the top-right corner start to be excluded, but
there is exibility in how to select products in this region. (In Figure 3(c) we remove
those with relatively low v.) When m is below about 0:454, k < 1 and k    < 0. Then
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result (iii) in Proposition 3 applies: now there are no non-exclusive products with v > k
any more. In this case as we already pointed out the products with v close to k will all be
excluded regardless of their . It is also worth mentioning that when m becomes smaller,
the intermediary tends to stock more exclusive products proportionally. (The fraction
of exclusive products among all stocked products is 0, 0:3, 0:46, and 0:5, respectively, in
the above four cases in Figure 3.) This is because when the store becomes smaller, the
intermediary may need to use more exclusively available products to induce consumers to
visit.
5 Comparison With the Social Optimum
We now turn to the optimal product selection by a social planner who aims to maximize
total welfare which is dened as the sum of industry prot and consumer surplus. We
assume that the social planner can control the stocking policy q but not rm pricing and
consumer search behavior.
As we pointed out before, if visiting the intermediary does not improve search e¢ ciency
(i.e., if h(m) = m), consumers always prefer cherry-picking from manufacturers directly.
In that case they buy a product if and only if it provides a positive net surplus v  s > 0.
While in the case with the intermediary, they are forced to buy some low-v products
with a negative net surplus in order to get other high-v products with a positive net
surplus. This observation suggests that the intermediary might be too bigor stock too
many products exclusively, relative to the socially optimal size. But this negative e¤ect
on consumers will be mitigated by the improved search e¢ ciency when h(m) < m. On
the other hand, as we also mentioned before, consumers search too little relative to the
social optimum because they ignore the e¤ect of their search decision on prot. When a
product has v slightly below s, a consumer of type s will not search it in the case of no
intermediary. But from the social planners view she should have searched it as long as
it is socially e¢ cient (i.e. if  + v > s). Therefore, the intermediary can improve market
e¢ ciency by forcing consumers to search some low-v but socially e¢ cient products. The
following analysis will illustrate these three e¤ects. In general it is hard to compare them
analytically, though numerical examples suggest that the rst e¤ect dominates.
Given a stocking policy q, the consumer search rule is the same as in Lemma 3. Total
welfare can then be written as
W (q) 
Z
F (v) dG+(q) +
Z k
0
u1 (s;q) dF (s) +
Z s
k
u0 (s;q) dF (s) : (22)
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The rst term is the prots of manufacturers, who always earn F (v) regardless of
whether they sell their product by themselves or via the intermediary. The second one is
the intermediarys prot, which we dened earlier in equation (13). The third one is the
surplus of consumers with s < k who search the intermediary, where u1 (s;q) was dened
earlier in equation (10). The forth one is the surplus of consumers with s  k who choose
not to visit the intermediary, where u0 (s;q) again was dened earlier in equation (11).
Notice that the consumers with s  k are always made (weakly) worse o¤ by the presence
of intermediary, because it restricts access to products with high v (if stocked exclusively)
which ordinarily they would like to buy from the manufacturer. On the other hand,
whether the presence of the intermediary benets the consumers with s < k depends on
the strength of search economies generated by visiting the intermediary.
The social planner wishes to choose a stocking policy q in order to maximize W (q).
In the following, we focus on the case with no stocking space limit (i.e., m = 1). The
analysis is then parallel to Section 4.1. (The case with a binding space constraint can be
dealt with similarly as in Section 4.2.) We again use m =
R
qdG to denote the measure of
products stocked by the intermediary. We have the following preliminary characterization
of the social optimum:
Lemma 6 (i) The social optimum always has a strictly positive measure of products if
h (m) = m for all m 2 [0; 1] or if h (m) < m for some m 2 (0; 1].
(ii) When the optimum has m > 0 and consumers adopt a search rule with threshold k,
(a) all products with v > k (if any) must be stocked, and for each v > k there exists w+(v)
such that product (; v) is stocked exclusively if and only if   w+(v); (b) among the
products with v < k (if any), for each v < k there exists w (v) such that product (; v) is
stocked if and only if   w (v).
Qualitatively the socially optimal stocking policy is like the one adopted by the in-
termediary in section 4.1. The intuition and the proof are both closely related to that of
Lemma 5. We then solve explicitly for the social planners optimum. As before, we treat
the consumer search rule in equation (14) and m =
R
qdG as two constraints, and let 
and  be the respective multipliers associated with these two constraints.
Proposition 4 In the general case without stocking space limit, suppose the social op-
timum has m > 0 and k 2 (0; s) (which is true if the conditions in Lemma 6 hold and
maxx
R v
x
vdG=h(
R v
x
dG) < s). Then the socially optimal product selection features either
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(i) m < 1, and among the products with v < k, only those with
  (kh
0(m)  v) + R k
v
(s  v)dF (s) + (h0(m)  1) R k
0
sdF (s)
F (k)  F (v) (23)
are stocked and the exclusivity arrangement does not matter, and among the products with
v > k (if k < v), those with
  (k   v) +
R k
v
(s  v)dF (s)
F (k)  F (v) (24)
are stocked exclusively and the others are stocked non-exclusively. In this case, the para-
meters k, , and m solve the same system of equations as (18) - (20).
or
(ii) m = 1 (i.e., all products are stocked), and among the products with v > k (if k < v),
those with
  (k   v) +
R k
v
(s  v)dF (s)
F (k)  F (v)
are stocked exclusively, and the exclusivity arrangement for the products with v < k does
not matter. In this case,  and k solve (18) and (19) with q = 1 and m = 1.
This characterization is qualitatively similar to the optimal product range in Propo-
sition 2. In particular, the parameters k, , and m solve the same system as in the
intermediarys problem. But this does not imply that they will have the same solution
in the two problems, because for given k, , and m the product selection takes di¤erent
forms in the two problems. For this reason, a general comparison between the socially
optimal selection and the intermediarys optimal selection is hard. Nevertheless for a
xed (k; ), by comparing (17) and (24) and using the fact
R k
v
(s  v)dF (s) > 0 for v > k,
we can deduce that the intermediary stocks too many products exclusively relative to the
socially optimal size. Intuitively when the intermediary considers stocking some products
exclusively, it neglects the negative impact it has on consumers with high search costs,
who choose not to search it and therefore lose the ability to buy those products. Similarly,
for a xed (k; ), by comparing (16) and (23) we can see that if h0(m) = 1 (i.e., if there
are no marginal economies of search), the intermediary stocks too many low-v products.
But this e¤ect can be reversed if h0(m) is su¢ ciently small.
To illustrate, we return to our running example with G(; v) = v and F (s) = s. We
compare the socially optimal solution with the prot-maximizing solution when h(m) = m
and h(m) = 0:4 + 0:5m, respectively. In the rst example, one can check that k =
 = 1
2
(which is the same as in the intermediarys solution) and m  0:6875 in the
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socially optimal solution. Figure 4(a) below describes the socially optimal product range.
Compared to the intermediarys solution, the social planner stocks fewer products overall
and fewer products exclusively, and the social planners product set is a strict subset of the
intermediarys. In the second example, one can solve k  0:440,   0:487 andm  0:963.
Note that k and  are now di¤erent from those solved in the intermediarys problem and
m is slightly smaller. Figure 4(b) below describes the socially optimal product range in
this example. Again, the social planner stocks fewer products overall and fewer products
exclusively than the intermediary, though in this example the social planners product set
is not exactly a subset of the intermediarys.
E
NE
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
v
pi
(a) h(m) = m
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(b) h(m) = 0:4 + 0:5m
Figure 4: Socially optimal product range
Finally, it is worth mentioning that although the intermediary tends to stock too
many products exclusively relative to the social optimum, banning exclusive products all
together can harm e¢ ciency unless economies of search are su¢ ciently strong. This can
be easily seen from the extreme case of h(m) = m where the intermediary will not exist
if no exclusive contracts are allowed, and this can reduce total welfare as we have seen in
the two examples in Figure 1.
6 Discussion
In this section, we rst discuss the foundation of the (; v) product space, and then
study an extension with upstream competition (i.e., each product having more than one
manufacturer).
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6.1 Foundation of (; v) Product Space
We provide two classes of demand functions which can generate the (; v) product space.
We also discuss how a products demand curvature or demand elasticity a¤ects where it
is located in the product space.
Demand curvature: Suppose that product i has a constant-curvature demand function:
Qi (pi) = ai

1  1  i
2  i (pi   i)
 1
1 i
; (25)
where ai > 0 denotes the scale of demand, i  0 is the minimum allowed price, and
i 2 ( 1; 2) is the curvature of the demand curve.33 When i < 1, the support of price
is [i; i +
2 i
1 i ]; when 1  i < 2, the support of price is [i;1). This is a rich class
which includes very concave rectangular-shapeddemand when i is su¢ ciently negative,
linear demand when i = 0, exponential demand when i = 1, and very convex demand
close to the original point when i is close to 2.34
When unit cost is ci  i, monopoly price is pmi = 1+ i 1 i2 i + ci2 i . Then monopoly
prot and consumer surplus are respectively
i = ai

1
2  i
 1
1 i

1 + (i   ci)
1  i
2  i
 2 i
1 i
;
and
vi = ai

1
2  i
 2 i
1 i

1 + (i   ci)
1  i
2  i
 2 i
1 i
:
Notice that both i and vi are increasing in the demand scale parameter ai, and i=vi =
2   i. For each xed i, we can generate a ray from the original point by varying
ai. By varying i, we can change the slope of the ray to cover the whole quadrant R2+.
(Intuitively, when i is lower demand is more concave and rectangular-shaped, such
that the rm can appropriate more of the available surplus and so i
vi
becomes higher.)
Consequently, in this example, the high-v and low- loss-making products are those with
a relatively large and convex demand (i.e. those with relatively high ai and i). While
the protable low-v and high- products are those with a relatively large and concave
demand (i.e. those with relatively high ai and low i).35
33The curvature of demand function Q(p) is dened as Q00 (p)Q (p) = [Q0 (p)]2. It measures the elasticity
of the slope of the inverse demand function.
34It also includes constant elasticity demand when i =
2+i
1+i
2 (1; 2).
35Anderson and Renault (2003) and Weyl and Fabinger (2013) show that this insight extends beyond
the class of demands discussed here. In particular they show that in general demands that are more
concaveare associated with a higher i=vi ratio.
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Demand elasticity: Suppose that product is demand function is
Qi (pi) = ai (1  pii )
for pi 2 [0; 1], where ai > 0 is the scale parameter as before, and i > 0 is now an elasticity
parameter. For any pi 2 (0; 1), the demand elasticity is
ip
i
i
1  pii
;
and it decreases in i. When i is close to 0, the demand is very convex and price sensitive;
when i is large, the demand is very concave and price insensitive.
To get analytical solutions, let us assume ci = 0. The monopoly price is then pmi =
( 1
1+i
)
1
i , and monopoly prot and consumer surplus are respectively
i =
aii
1 + i

1
1 + i
 1
i
; and vi =
aii
1 + i
 
1  2 + i
1 + i

1
1 + i
 1
i
!
:
Both i and vi increase in ai, and i=vi increases in i and so decreases in elasticity.36
Intuitively when demand is more elastic the monopoly price is lower, such that prot is
lower and consumer surplus is higher. Hence viewed in light of this class of demands,
the intermediary tends to use the products with a relatively large and elastic demand to
drive store tra¢ c, and earns prot from the products with a relatively large and inelastic
demand.
Discussion. Suppose  and v are determined by two product-specic parameters, such
as (a; ) in the above examples (assuming in the rst example that we x  = c = 0).
Then generically there is a one-to-one correspondence between (a; ) and (; v), such that
each point in the (; v) space represents a single product.37 Nevertheless, if  and v are
determined by more than two parameters like in the rst example with product specic 
and c, then generically each point in the (; v) space represents a continuum of di¤erent
products. In this case, the stocking policy function q(; v) can take a continuous value
in [0; 1] with the interpretation that q(; v) fraction of the products at point (; v) are
stocked. This, however, does not a¤ect our analysis because all the objective functions in
this paper are linear in the stocking policy variables, and so we always have bang-bang
solutions.
36In this example i=vi > 1 for any i > 0, so it can only genearate half of the quadrant R2+.
37Notice, however, that even if products are uniformly distributed in the (a; ) space, they can be
non-uniformly distributed in the (; v) space. That is why we consider a general distribution G.
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6.2 Upstream competition
We now extend our model by introducing upstream competition between manufacturers
and show that our main insights are still valid. In particular we assume now that each
product is supplied by two homogeneous manufacturers. To simplify the exposition we
focus on the case of no search economies i.e. h (m) = m, where m denotes the measure of
distinct products stocked by the intermediary. (Therefore if the intermediary contracts
with two manufacturers supplying the same product, the cost of searching the interme-
diary only increases by one unit.) We also assume that the intermediary has no stocking
constraint i.e. m = 1, and is able to o¤er both exclusive and non-exclusive contracts.
The timing closely follows that of the main model. At the rst stage the intermediary
announces to all manufacturers its stocking intentions, and then makes public (possibly
discriminatory) o¤ers which specify both a two-part tari¤ and (non-)exclusivity. Manu-
facturers simultaneously accept or reject their o¤ers, and (when appropriate) believe that
the other manufacturer of their product will accept. At the following stages rms set
prices and consumers search sequentially with passive beliefs and randomize whenever
indi¤erent.
Closely following Lemma 1 from earlier, we can prove that in equilibrium all sellers of a
product charge the monopoly price. The intuition is the same as before: the intermediary
uses bilaterally-e¢ cient two-part tari¤s to avoid double marginalization, and the search
friction nullies direct pricing competition between sellers just like in Diamond (1971).38
Consequently we can still represent products as points in a two-dimensional (; v) space.
In the spirit of our earlier analysis, qE(; v) 2 f0; 1g indicates whether product (; v) is
stocked exclusively by the intermediary i.e. consumers cannot buy it elsewhere. That is,
qE(; v) = 1 if and only if the intermediary contracts with both manufacturers exclusively.
Similarly, qNE(; v) 2 f0; 1g indicates whether product (; v) is stocked non-exclusively
by the intermediary i.e. consumers also have the opportunity to buy it from a manufac-
turer. That is, qNE(; v) = 1 if and only if the intermediary contracts with at least one
manufacturer non-exclusively. Hence
q (; v) = qE(; v) + qNE(; v) 2 f0; 1g
indicates whether or not the intermediary stocks product (; v). It is straightforward to see
38One subtle di¤erence is that here we need f(0) = 0 to sustain monopoly pricing when the manufac-
turers both sell direct to consumers. This condition is satised as long as s is bounded away from 0. In
the uniform example below, for convenience we still assume s  U [0; 1], but this can be regarded as the
limit case of s  U [; + 1] with ! 0.
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that given monopoly pricing, the payo¤s from respectively searching and not searching the
intermediary are the same as those in equations (10) and (11) with h(m) = m. Therefore
Lemma 3 implies that provided
R
qEdG > 0 and s  v, there is a unique cuto¤ k 2 (v; v)
satisfying (12) with h(m) = m, such that consumers search the intermediary if and only
if s < k. For convenience, we rewrite it here asZ
v<k
q (v   k) dG+
Z
v>k
qE (v   k) dG = 0 : (26)
Notice that given that the two manufacturers for each product are homogeneous, here only
the stocking policy at the product level (instead of at the manufacturer level) matters for
consumer search decision.
Now consider how much the intermediary must compensate manufacturers (on top of
the production cost) in order to stock their product. The following is a useful preliminary
result:
Lemma 7 (i) If the intermediary contracts with both manufacturers of a product non-
exclusively, it does not need to compensate them.
(ii) If the intermediary contracts with both manufacturers of a product exclusively, it needs
to compensate each by an amount max f0;  [F (v)  F (k)]g.
(iii) It is (weakly) dominated for the intermediary to contract with only one manufacturer
of a product, or to contract with both but only exclusively with one of them.
We explain parts (i) and (ii), and leave the details of part (iii) to the appendix. First
consider products with v < k. Provided one manufacturer supplies the intermediary, the
other manufacturer expects to make no sales and is therefore willing to also supply the
intermediary at marginal cost. Second consider products with v > k. Provided one man-
ufacturer supplies the intermediary, the other manufacturer is unable to sell its product
to consumers with s < k. If the intermediary contracts with both manufacturers non-
exclusively, each manufacturer earns 1
2
 [F (v)  F (k)] irrespective of whether it accepts
or rejects the intermediarys contract. Hence in this case each manufacturer is willing
to provide its product to the intermediary at marginal cost. If instead the intermediary
wishes to have exclusive sales rights, a manufacturer that rejects its contract becomes a
monopolist over consumers with s 2 (k; v) and therefore earns  [F (v)  F (k)]. Hence
in this case each manufacturer must be compensated by that amount.
Lemma 7 implies that the intermediary only needs to consider three options: either
not stock a product, or stock it according to options (i) or (ii). Whenever it stocks a
product, the intermediary contracts with both the manufacturers so as to induce them to
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accept lower compensation. It is now without loss of generality to use qNE(; v) 2 f0; 1g
to indicate whether the intermediary contracts with both manufacturers non-exclusively.
The intermediarys prot function is thenZ
v<k
qF (k)dG+
Z
v>k
qNEF (k)dG+
Z
v>k
qE[3F (k)  2F (v)]dG : (27)
According to Lemma 7, no compensation beyond the production cost is needed for stocking
a product with v < k (regardless of whether it is stocked exclusively or non-exclusively)
or stocking a product with v > k non-exclusively. For a given k, these products are
now cheaper to stock than in the basic model due to the upstream competition. For
an exclusively stocked product with v > k, the intermediary earns gross prot F (k)
but needs to pay 2 [F (v)  F (k)] to its manufacturers. The compensation to each
manufacturer is also lower than in the basic model, but the intermediary now needs
to compensate two manufacturers instead of one. Whether it is now cheaper or more
expensive to stock these exclusive products depends on v. Those with F (v) < 2F (k)
become cheaper to stock (and can even become prot generators), while those with F (v) >
2F (k) (if any) become more expensive to stock.
The intermediary maximizes (27) subject to the search constraint (26). The La-
grangian function of this optimization problem is
L =
Z
v<k
q [F (k) +  (v   k)] dG+
Z
v>k
qNEF (k) dG
+
Z
v>k
qE f [3F (k)  2F (v)] +  (v   k)g dG : (28)
It is easy to argue that some products must be stocked exclusively in the optimal solution,
so we must have an interior solution k 2 (v; v). Then the rst-order condition of (28)
with respect to k yields
 = f (k)
R
v<k
qdG+
R
v>k
qNEdG+ 3
R
v>k
qEdGR
v<k
qdG+
R
v>k
qEdG
; (29)
from which we deduce  > 0. Then it is straightforward to derive the following result.
Proposition 5 The optimal product selection with upstream competition is characterized
as follows:
(i) The intermediary buys products with v < k from both manufacturers if
  k   v
F (k)
;
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and otherwise does not stock them.
(ii) The intermediary buys all products with v > k from both manufacturers. It contracts
with the manufacturers exclusively if
  
2
v   k
F (v)  F (k) ;
and otherwise contracts with them non-exclusively. The parameters k and  solve equa-
tions (26) and (29).
Our predictions about the intermediarys optimal product range are thus qualitatively
robust to the introduction of upstream competition. Nevertheless notice that for a xed
(k; ), both the stocking region of v < k and the non-exclusive region of v > k expands
compared to the basic model. This is because these products are now cheaper to acquire
as we have explained. While the exclusive region of v > k shrinks since the boundary in
part (ii) is lower than (17). This is because stocking the products with v > k exclusively
is now relatively less protable compared to stocking them non-exclusively. Of course
considering upstream competition will change (k; ) as well. Once that is taken into
account, it appears no general conclusions can be drawn. Figure 5 plots the optimal
product range in the example with uniform product space when F (s) = s and F (s) =
p
s,
respectively. In former case, the intermediary stocks fewer exclusive products and also
fewer products overall compared to the basic model, while the opposite is true in the
latter case.
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Figure 5: Optimal product range with upstream competition
However, as expected in both cases the intermediarys prot is higher than in the ba-
sic model, since the upstream competition brings down the overall compensation needed
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for the manufacturers. The prot increases from 1
32
to about 0:2 in the rst case, and
from about 0:036 to about 0:305 in the second. The main source of the signicant prot
improvement is the reduced compensation to the manufacturers, instead of the reop-
timization of the product selection. For example, in the rst case if the intermediary
simply adopted the same stocking policy as in the basic model, its prot would already
increase to 0:1875. Reoptimization further improves the prot, but only by a relatively
small amount. Finally, notice that this also implies that the intermediary has a strong
incentive to produce a private label of a product, since it has a similar e¤ect as introducing
upstream competition in reducing the compensation to the manufacturer.
7 Conclusion
Product range is an important choice for retailers who intermediate between manufac-
turers and consumers. This paper has developed a framework for studying the optimal
product range choice of a multiproduct intermediary when consumers need a basket of
products and face shopping frictions (both of which are natural features of retail markets).
We have shown that (i) whenever the intermediary can use exclusive contracts, it exists
protably even if it does not improve search e¢ ciency for consumers; (ii) the interme-
diary uses exclusively stocked products that consumers value highly in order to increase
search, and makes prot from non-exclusively stocked products that are relatively cheap
to buy from manufacturers; (iii) the intermediary tends to be too big and stock too many
products exclusively compared to the socially optimal size.
This paper clearly has a few limitations which we hope to address in future work.
First, we have intentionally simplied the pricing decisions of manufacturers and the
intermediary by assuming two-part-tari¤ contracts and unobservability of prices before
consumers search. This has enabled us to study the optimal product range and exclusivity
in a tractable way. Second, we have focused on a monopoly intermediary. Thus we
have not studied how competition among intermediaries might shape their product range
choice, which is certainly an important dimension in reality. Third, we have assumed
that each product has only one manufacturer or two homogenous manufacturers. It
will be interesting to consider multiple manufacturers for each product which supply
di¤erentiated versions. We will then be able to study both the breadth and depth of an
intermediarys product range choice.
Finally, we want to point out that the framework developed in this paper could be
modied to study other types of intermediary. For example, a key decision for a shopping
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mall is what stores it should include. If we regard each store as a product category, the
problem becomes similar to product range choice and it is important to take into account
the externalities each store has on other stores. Of course a shopping mall is more like a
platform which does not possess the products and allows decentralized pricing. But the
situation is actually similar to our model if each store in the mall sets the same price as in
their own outlets. Another possible application is intermediaries in international trade.39
In that case retailers in a destination country act as consumers in our model and have
demand for multiple products. Direct trade can be too costly for some manufacturers
and retailers, and so they choose to use trade intermediaries. The range of products an
intermediary handles can be an important factor retailers care about.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. (i) Consider an equilibrium in which a set AM of products
are sold only by their manufacturers, a set AE of products are stocked exclusively by the
intermediary, and a set ANE of products are stocked non-exclusively by the intermediary.
Let pl be the equilibrium price of product l 2 AM , pj be the equilibrium price of product
j 2 AE, and pi;M and pi;I be the equilibrium price of product i 2 ANE at its manufacturer
and the intermediary, respectively. Note that if pi;I > pi;M it is possible that a consumer
visits the intermediary which stocks product i but buys product i from its manufacturer.
However if pi;I  pi;M it is impossible that in equilibrium a consumer visits both the
intermediary and the manufacturer.
(i-1) As in the case of no intermediary, it is easy to see pl = pml for l 2 AM given our
informational assumption.
(i-2) We then show pj = pmj for j 2 AE. Suppose the wholesale price of prod-
uct j is  j. The hold-up logic implies that the intermediary must charge pj ( j) =
argmaxp (p   j)Qj (p). (Note that pj (cj) = pmj .) Since the intermediary makes a take-it-
or-leave-it o¤er, it will optimally o¤er a lump-sum fee Tj = jF (vj) ( j   cj)Qj(pj ( j))
 to manufacturer j, where  is the measure of consumers who visit the intermediary and
which only depends on the expected surplus from visiting the intermediary. (In particu-
lar, given consumers do not observe the contract details,  is independent of the actual
wholesale price  j.) Hence the intermediarys prot from stocking product j exclusively
39See, e.g., Bernard et al. (2010) and Ahn et al. (2011) for empirical evidence on trade intermediaries
in the US and China, respectively.
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is
  [pj ( j)   j]Qj(pj ( j))  Tj =  

pj ( j)  cj

Qj(p

j ( j))  jF (vj) : (30)
This is maximized at pj ( j) = p
m
j such that the intermediary should o¤er a wholesale
price  j = cj.
(i-3) We nally show pi;I = pi;M = pmi for i 2 ANE. The proof consists of a few steps.
Step 1: pi;M  pmi .
If in contrast pi;M > pmi in equilibrium, then reducing pi;M slightly will be a protable
deviation. First, the number of consumers who buy product i from respectively the
intermediary and manufacturer i does not change. For those consumers who visit the
intermediary and buy product i there, they do not observe manufacturer is price reduction
and so still buy from the intermediary. For those consumers who visit the intermediary
rst and then come to manufacturer i, they will be surprised by the price reduction but
will still buy from manufacturer i as originally planned. The number of such consumers
does not increase since their search decision is based on expected equilibrium prices. For
those who visit manufacturer i rst, their initial plan must be to buy product i at the
manufacturer (otherwise they would have no reason to visit it). Again a private price
reduction will not increase the number of such consumers, and once they arrive they buy
as planned (given passive beliefs). Second then, manufacturer i earns strictly more prot
from its direct sales to consumers, and earns the same prot from sales made through the
intermediary.
Step 2: pi;M = pmi .
If in contrast pi;M < pmi in equilibrium, then increasing pi;M slightly will be a protable
deviation. Consider the following two cases separately:
(a) pi;I > pi;M . Consider a slight increase to pi;M + " < minfpi;I ; pmi g. For those who
visit the intermediary rst and then come to manufacturer i (based on the expected price),
they will be surprised by manufacturer is price increase but will still buy from it since
its price remains strictly below pi;I . For those who visit manufacturer i rst (again, based
on the expected price), they will buy as planned given the new price is still lower than
pi;I . Therefore, the number of consumers who buy at manufacturer i remains unchanged,
but the prot from each of them is now higher.
(b) pi;I  pi;M . For those who visit the intermediary rst, they will not come to
manufacturer i according to their beliefs, so they are irrelevant for a private price devi-
ation. For those who plan to visit manufacturer i, they must not visit the intermediary
on equilibrium path. If pi;M is slightly increased, will some of them switch to visiting
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the intermediary? The answer is no, because in our continuum framework this single
price deviation has a zero-measure impact on the consumer surplus from not visiting the
intermediary and so will not change consumer search behavior.40 Therefore again a small
price increase will improve manufacturer is prot.
Step 3: pi;I  pmi .
Suppose in contrast pi;I > pmi (= pi;M) in equilibrium. In this case, there are two
possible types of consumer who buy product i. Let i;I be the measure of consumers
who buy i at the intermediary, and let i;M be the measure of consumers who buy i at
manufacturer i. (Some of the latter consumers may visit the intermediary but buy from
the manufacturer.) Consider two cases separately:
(a)  i  ci. Then a small reduction of pi;I will be a protable deviation. Slightly
decreasing pi;I will weakly increase i;I . At the same time the intermediary makes a
higher prot from each such consumer given that pi ( i)  pmi < pi;I .
(b)  i > ci. In this case we argue that a deviation to p0i;I = p
m
i (together with an
adjustment of the two-part tari¤) will be protable. In the hypothetical equilibrium, we
must have
Ti + i;I  ( i   ci)Qi(pi;I) + i;M  i = iF (vi) :
Then the intermediarys prot from product i is
i;I  (pi;I    i)Qi(pi;I)  Ti = i;I  (pi;I   ci)Qi(pi;I) + i;M  i   iF (vi) :
If pi;I is reduced to pmi , (pi;I   ci)Qi(pi;I) will increase to i, the per-consumer monopoly
prot, and i;I + i;M will increase at least weakly.
41 Then the prot must be improved.
Step 4: pi;I = pmi .
Suppose in contrast pi;I < pmi (= pi;M) in equilibrium. Then if a consumer visits the
intermediary, she will not visit manufacturer i. In this case it is then impossible that
40With a discrete number of products, the same result holds by a slightly di¤erent argument. Consider
a consumer who is ex ante indi¤erent between whether or not to visit the intermediary. If she visits
manufacturer i and nds pi;M slightly higher than expected, will she now want to visit the intermediary?
Since the cost of visiting the manufacturer is already sunk, she actually would have a strict preference
for not visiting the intermediary if pi;M remained the same as expected. Therefore the same is true if
pi;M is only slightly higher than she expected.
41In fact, it can be shown that i;I+i;M remains unchanged. The consumers who buy product i can be
divided into three groups: some dont visit the intermediary and buy i at manufacturer i; some visit the
intermediary but buy i at manufacturer i; the rest visit the intermediary and buy i there. The deviation
does not a¤ect the rst group. The deviation may a¤ect the distribution of consumers between the second
and the third group, but does not a¤ect the total number of consumers who visit the intermediary which
only depends on the expected prices.
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 i  ci. Otherwise the intermediary could improve its prot from product i by raising
pi;I slightly. (Note that this deviation does not a¤ect the number of consumers who visit
the intermediary, and once they arrive they will still buy product i at the intermediary
as long as pi;I is still below pi;M .)
Now consider the possibility of  i < ci. Then we must have pi;I = pi ( i) in an
equilibrium. Then a deviation to  0i = ci and p
0
i;I = p
m
i will be protable. (Given the
contract details are unobservable to consumers, such a deviation will not a¤ect the number
of consumers who visit the intermediary and buy i.)
This completes the proof for pi;I = pi;M = pmi for i 2 ANE.
(ii) The equilibrium two-part tari¤ for product j 2 AE has been proved in (i-2)
above. Now consider the equilibrium two-part tari¤ for product i 2 ANE. It is easy to
see that  i < ci is impossible. Otherwise the intermediary would have an incentive to
reduce its price for product i to pi ( i). However, we cannot rule out the possibility of
 i > ci (together with Ti such that manufacturer is prot is iF (vi)). The reason is
that if the intermediary raises its price for product i above pmi , some consumers who visit
the intermediary and initially planned to buy i there may then switch to buying from
manufacturer i. If the number of such consumers is large enough (which requires f(s) to
be large enough for small s), the intermediary does not dare to raise its price.
Fortunately, this indeterminacy of the contract details does not matter for our subse-
quent analysis of optimal product selection. Suppose in an equilibrium  i 6= ci for some
i 2 ANE. The lump-sum fee Ti satises
Ti + i;I  ( i   ci)Qi(pi;I) + i;M  i = iF (vi) :
Note that given the monopoly pricing result, i;I is also the number of consumers who visit
the intermediary which is denoted by I . Then the intermediarys prot from stocking
product i is
I  (pmi    i)Qi(pmi )  Ti = I  (pmi   ci)Qi(pmi ) + i;M  i   iF (vi)
= i [I   (F (vi)  i;M)] : (31)
Since consumer search and purchase behavior only depends on the retail prices, this
prot is the same as if  i = ci. Therefore, without loss of generality, we can focus on a
contracting outcome with  i = ci.
Proof of Lemma 2. (i) We rst show that the intermediary can make a positive
prot by stocking a positive measure of products. Consider two interior points in
: (1; ~v)
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and (2; ~v) with 1 > 2. Let A1 = [1   ; 1]  [~v   ; ~v] and A2 = [2; 2 +(v)] 
[~v; ~v + ], where (v) is uniquely dened for each v 2 [~v; ~v + ] byZ 1
1 
g (; 2~v   v) d =
Z 2+(v)
2
g (; v) d : (32)
Convexity of 
 implies that we have A1; A2  
 for su¢ ciently small   0 and  > 0.
Notice that (v) is constructed in such a way that for each v in A2, the mass of products
stocked is the same as that of the mirrorvaluation 2~v   v in A1. This implies that
the average v of the products in A1 [ A2 is always ~v, and so a consumer will visit the
intermediary, when it stocks A = A1 [ A2, if and only if s < ~v.
Fix a su¢ ciently small  such that 1    > 2 + (v) for all v 2 [~v; ~v + ]. The
intermediarys prot from stocking A = A1 [ A2 is
() =
Z ~v
~v 
Z 1
1 
 [F (~v)  F (v)] dG+
Z ~v+
~v
Z 2+(v)
2
 [F (~v)  F (v)] dG :
Straightforward calculations reveal that (0) = 0 (0) = 0. However,
00 (0) = f (~v)
"Z 1
1 
g (; ~v) d  
Z 2+(~v)
2
g (; ~v) d
#
> f (~v)
"
(1   )
Z 1
1 
g (; ~v) d   (2 +(~v))
Z 2+(~v)
2
g (; ~v) d
#
= f (~v) [(1   )  (2 +(~v))]
Z 1
1 
g (; ~v) d > 0 ;
where the second equality used (32) evaluated at v = ~v. Therefore, () > 0 for  in a
neighborhood of 0.
(ii) We then show that stocking all the products is not the most protable strategy. Let
v^ =
R


vdG. Consider B1 = [1   ; 1] [v^; v^ + ] and B2 = [2; 2 +(v)] [v^   ; v^],
where 1 > 2, and where (v) is uniquely dened for each v 2 [v^   ; v^] byZ 1
1 
g (; 2v^   v) d =
Z 2+(v)
2
g (; v) d : (33)
Convexity of 
 implies that B1; B2  
 for su¢ ciently small   0 and  > 0. Similarly
as above, the average v of the products in B1 [ B2 is always v^, and so the average v in
A = 
n (B1 [B2) is v^ as well. Then a consumer will visit the intermediary, when it stocks
A = 
n (B1 [B2), if and only if s < v^.
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Fix a su¢ ciently small  such that 1    > 2 + (v) for all v 2 [v^   ; v^]. The
intermediarys prot from stocking A = 
n (B1 [B2) is
^ () = ^ 
Z v^+
v^
Z 1
1 
 [F (v^)  F (v)] dG 
Z v^
v^ 
Z 2+(v)
2
 [F (v^)  F (v)] dG ;
where ^ = ^ (0) is the prot from stocking 
. Simple calculations reveal that ^0 (0) = 0.
However, similar as in (i),
^00 (0) = f (v^)
"Z 1
1 
g (; v^) d  
Z 2+(v^)
2
g (; v^) d
#
> 0
by using (33) evaluated at v = v^. Therefore, ^ () > ^ for  in a neighborhood of 0.
Proof of Proposition 1. It remains to prove that (8) and (9) have a solution with
k 2 (v; v).42 Let (v; k)  k v
F (k) F (v) .
We rst claim that for any k 2 (v; v), (9) has a unique solution
(k) 2


maxv (v; k)
;

minv (v; k)

and 0 (k) 2 (0;1). The proof is as follows. The left-hand side of (9) is strictly negative
when maxv (v; k)  , because then v  k for all products in I (k; ) and v < k for
a strictly positive measure of them. The left-hand side of (9) is strictly positive when
minv (v; k)   and the reasoning is the same. The left-hand side of (9) is also strictly
increasing in  in the above range, since as  increases the top-left region in I(k; ) with
v   k < 0 shrinks while the bottom-right region with v   k > 0 expands. Uniqueness
of  (k) then follows. Dene (v) = limk!v (k) and (v) = limk!v (k). We must have
(v)(v; v)   and (v)(v; v)   for any v (or except for a zero-measure set). Notice
also that the left-hand side of (9) is C1 in (; k), so the implicit function theorem implies
that (k) is di¤erentiable. 0 (k) 2 (0;1) can be veried by direct computation.
Now consider (8) with  replaced by (k):Z
I(k;(k))
(f(k)   (k))dG = 0 : (34)
We show that it has a solution k 2 (v; v). Consider the following di¤erentiable function
of k:
(k) =
Z
I(k;(k))
[(F (k)  F (v)) + (k)(v   k)] dG :
42In numerical examples we nd that the system has a unique solution with k 2 (v; v), though we have
been unable to formally prove uniqueness.
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When k = v or v, I(k; (k)) is an empty set and so (v) = (v) = 0. According to the
construction of I(k; ) and the denition of (k), (k) > 0 for k 2 (v; v). Therefore by
the mean-value theorem 0(k) = 0 must have a solution in (v; v). On the other hand, one
can verify that 0(k) equals the left-hand side of (34) by using the denition of (k) and
the construction of I(k; ). Then (34) must have a solution k 2 (v; v).
Proof of Lemma 3. The di¤erence in payo¤ between (10) and (11) is
(s) =
Z
qvdG  h(
Z
qdG)s 
Z
v>s
qNE (v   s) dG : (35)
(We have used q qE = qNE.) Notice that (0)  0, and (s) is weakly concave because
0(s) =  h(
Z
qdG) +
Z
v>s
qNEdG
is weakly decreasing in s.
(i) No consumer visits the intermediary (i.e. k = 0) if and only if (s)  0 for all
s > 0. A necessary and su¢ cient condition for this is (0) = 0 and 0 (0)  0, which is
equivalent to the conditions stated in the lemma.
(ii) All consumers visit the intermediary (i.e. k > s) if and only if (s) > 0 for all
s > 0. A necessary and su¢ cient condition for this is (s) > 0, which simplies to the
condition in the lemma.
(iii) Finally in all other cases, (s) > 0 for s in a neighborhood of 0, and (s)  0, so
given that (s) is weakly concave consumers use a cut-o¤ strategy. Consumers strictly
prefer visiting the intermediary if they have s < k, where k solves (k) = 0. (12) is
just a rewriting of (k) = 0. In this case, k < v if and only if (v) < 0 which equalsR
qvdG  h(R qdG)v < 0.
Proof of Lemma 4. When h(m) = m for all m 2 [0; m], by a similar argument as in
the simple case we can show that the intermediary can make a strictly positive prot by
stocking some products exclusively. (Note that the set of exclusive products constructed
in Lemma 2 can be arbitrarily small.)
Now consider the case of h(m) < m for some m 2 (0; m].43 We show that the
intermediary can now makes a strictly positive prot by stocking some products non-
exclusively. Consider a product set A  
 such that R
A
dG = m and
R
A\fv<ag dG > 0
for any a > v. Such a set A always exists (e.g. when A is convex and minv2A v = v).
43In this case, it is possible that h(0) > 0. Then the approach in Lemma 2 does not apply because
k ! 0 when the measure of stocked products goes to 0. That is why we adopt a di¤erent approach.
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Suppose now the intermediary stocks all products in A non-exclusively (i.e., q = qNE = 1
only for (; v) 2 A). Then from (35) we can see (0) = 0, and
0(s) =  h(m) +m > 0
for all s 2 [0; v]. This implies k > v. From (13), it is ready to see that the intermediarys
prot is
R
A\fv<kg [F (k)  F (v)]dG > 0.
Proof of Lemma 5. (a) Suppose k < v so that there are products with v > k.
Suppose in contrast that in the optimal solution q, q = 0 for a strictly positive measure
of products with v > k. Denote this set of products by B. Consider a new stocking policy
~q such that
~q(; v) =
(
1 if (; v) 2 B
q(; v) otherwise
and ~qE = qE. (That is, the products in B are now stocked non-exclusively.) Let ~k be the
new consumer search threshold associated with ~q. We aim to show that this new stocking
policy is more protable than q and so a contradiction arises. We can see from (13) that
this is true if ~k  k, or equivalently if ~(k)  (k), where ~() is (35) associated with
the new stocking policy. Using the construction of ~q and the denition of () in (35),
one can check that
~ (k) (k) =
Z
B
(1  q)vdG  [h(
Z
~qdG)  h(
Z
qdG)]k  
Z
B
(1  q)(v   k)dG
=
Z
B
(1  q)dG  [h(
Z
~qdG)  h(
Z
qdG)]

k :
Since
R
~qdG  R qdG = R
B
(1  q)dG and h0 (m)  1 for all m, we have ~ (k) (k)  0.
Therefore, the proposed new stocking policy is a protable deviation, and so in the optimal
solution we must have q = 1 for all v > k.
We now prove the second part in result (a). Suppose in contrast that in the optimal
solution q, there is a strictly positive measure of v > k such that for each of these v, there
exist 0 > 00 such that qE (0; v) = 1 and qNE (00; v) = 1 (i.e., some high- products are
stocked exclusively while some low- products are stocked non-exclusively). Denote this
set of v by V . Now x the stocking policy for all products with v < k, but for those with
v > k dene a new policy ~q with
~qE(; v) = 1 if   ~ (v) and ~qNE(; v) = 1 if  > ~ (v) ;
where ~ (v) is the unique solution to
R ~(v)
(v)
g (; v) d =
R (v)
(v)
qE(; v)g (; v) d. (That is,
for each v > k, the mass of exclusively stocked products in the original stocking policy is
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shifted to the products with the lowest possible .) By construction this does not a¤ect
consumer search behavior (so ~k = k) since they only care about v. Then for each v > k,
we haveZ (v)
(v)
qE (; v) [F (k)  F (v)] g (; v) d 
Z (v)
(v)
~qE (; v)[F (~k)  F (v)]g (; v) d ;
with strict inequality for v 2 V . That is, the intermediary makes less loss from those
products with v > k under the new policy. This improves its prot, and so we have a
contradiction.
(b) Suppose that k > v so that there are products with v < k. Suppose in contrast
that in the optimal solution q, there is a strictly positive measure of v < k such that for
each of these v, there exists some 0 < 00 such that q (0; v) = 1 and q (00; v) = 0 (i.e.,
some low- products are stocked while some high- products are not). Denote this set of
v by V . Now x the stocking policy for products with v > k, but for products with v < k
dene a new policy with
~q (; v) =
(
1 if   ~ (v)
0 if  < ~ (v)
;
where ~ (v) is the unique solution to
R (v)
~(v)
g (; v) d =
R (v)
(v)
q (; v) g (; v) d. (That is,
for each v < k, the mass of stocked products in the original stocking policy is shifted to
the products with the highest possible .) Similarly as before, by construction this does
not a¤ect consumer search behavior (so ~k = k). Then for each v < k, we haveZ (v)
(v)
q (; v) [F (k)  F (v)] g (; v) d 
Z (v)
(v)
~q (; v)[F (~k)  F (v)]g (; v) d ;
with strict inequality for v 2 V . That is, the intermediary makes higher prot from those
products with v < k under the new policy. This is a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 2. We rst consider the case where m < 1 in the optimal
solution. Then the rst-order condition with respect to m is  = kh0(m). We use this
to replace  in our analysis. The rst-order condition with respect to k yields (19). The
other two equations (18) and (20) are simply the two constraints. Both k and  are
positive. From (15) it is ready to see that for v < k, q = 1 if and only if
(F (k)  F (v)) + v     0,    h
0(m)k   v
F (k)  F (v) ;
and the exclusivity arrangement does not matter. For v > k, notice that qE = 1 and
qNE = 1 are mutually exclusive, and k    = k(1  h0(m))  0. Then we deduce that
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qE = 1 if
(F (k)  F (v)) + v     k   ,    k   v
F (k)  F (v) ;
and qNE = 1 otherwise.
The case with m = 1 (so q = 1 everywhere) is simple. For v < k, again the exclusivity
arrangement does not matter. For v > k, the optimal exclusivity is determined the same
as above.
Proof of Proposition 3. From (21) it is ready to see that for v < k, q = 1 if and
only if
    v
F (k)  F (v) ;
and the exclusivity arrangement does not matter. Now consider v > k if k < v in the
optimal solution:
(i) If k  > 0 in the optimal solution, qE and qNE are determined exactly the same
as in the case with an unlimited stocking space. That is, qE = 1 if
  (k   v)
F (k)  F (v) ; (36)
and qNE = 1 otherwise.
(ii) If k    = 0 in the optimal solution, qE = 1 if (F (k)   F (v)) + v     0,
or equivalently if (36) holds as  = k. The intermediary is indi¤erent in how to select
the non-exclusive products among the others, as long as the mass of them can satisfy
k    = 0.
(iii) If k    < 0 in the optimal solution, it is clear that qNE = 0, and qE = 1 if
(F (k)  F (v)) + v     0, or equivalently if
    v
F (k)  F (v) :
Finally, the parameters ,  and k solve the system of the k constraint, the rst-order
condition with respect to k, and the space constraint. That is just (18)-(20) with m
replaced by m. (In the case of k    = 0, we have an additional equation, but in that
case to pin down the region of non-exclusive products with v > k, we also have another
parameter to determine if the region is parameterized by one parameter like we will do
in the numerical example below.)
Proof of Lemma 6. (i) The proof for the case h (m) = m for all m 2 [0; 1] is very
similar to the proof of Lemma 2 and hence is omitted. In the case where h (m) < m for
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somem 2 (0; 1], note that if the intermediary stocks a massm of products non-exclusively,
its prot is strictly higher (by Lemma 5) and consumers are no worse o¤ since they can
still buy every product from the manufacturer.
(ii-a) Suppose k < v so that there are products with v > k. Suppose in contrast that
in the optimal solution q, q = 0 for a strictly positive measure of products with v > k.
Denote this set of products by B. Consider a new stocking policy ~q such that
~q(; v) =
(
1 if (; v) 2 B
q(; v) otherwise
and ~qE = qE. In the proof of Lemma 5 we showed that the intermediarys prot is weakly
higher under ~q. Observe also that u0 (s;q) is unchanged, so consumers with s > k are
weakly better o¤ under ~q. Hence it remains to show that u1 (s;q) is weakly higher under
~q for all s < k. To prove this, notice that following the logic of the proof of Lemma 5,
u1 (s; ~q)  u1 (s;q) =
Z
B
(1  q)dG  [h(
Z
~qdG)  h(
Z
qdG)]

s ;
which is weakly positive since
R
~qdG   R qdG = R
B
(1   q)dG and h0 (m)  1 for all m.
Since all parties weakly benet from ~q we have a contradiction.
We now prove the second part in result (a). Suppose in contrast that in the optimal
solution q, there is a strictly positive measure of v > k such that for each of these v, there
exist 0 > 00 such that qE (0; v) = 1 and qNE (00; v) = 1. Denote this set of v by V . Now
x the stocking policy for all products with v < k, but for those with v > k dene a new
policy ~q with
~qE(; v) = 1 if   ~ (v) and ~qNE(; v) = 1 if  > ~ (v) ;
where ~ (v) is the unique solution to
R ~(v)
(v)
g (; v) d =
R (v)
(v)
qE (; v) g (; v) d. By
construction u0 (s; :) and u1 (s; :) are unchanged since consumers only care about v, hence
consumer surplus is unchanged. However in the proof of Lemma 5 we showed that the
intermediarys prot is higher under ~q, hence we have a contradiction.
(ii-b) Suppose that k > v so that there are products with v < k. Suppose in contrast
that in the optimal solution q, there is a strictly positive measure of v < k such that for
each of these v, there exists some 0 < 00 such that q (0; v) = 1 and q (00; v) = 0. Denote
this set of v by V . Now x the stocking policy for products with v > k, but for products
with v < k dene a new stocking policy
~q (; v) =
(
1 if   ~ (v)
0 if  < ~ (v)
;
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where ~ (v) is the unique solution to
R (v)
~(v)
g (; v) d =
R (v)
(v)
q (; v) g (; v) d. Similarly
as before, u0 (s; :) and u1 (s; :) are unchanged hence consumer surplus is unchanged. How-
ever in the proof of Lemma 5 we showed that the intermediarys prot is higher under ~q,
hence we have a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 4. Substituting the expressions for (q), u1 (s;q) and
u0 (s;q) into equation (22) yields
W (q) =
Z
(1  q)
Z v
0
( + v   s)dF (s)dG+
Z
q( + v)F (k)dG
 h(m)
Z k
0
sdF (s) +
Z
v>k
qNE
Z v
k
( + v   s)dF (s)dG : (37)
The rst term is the surplus generated by the products not stocked by the intermediary.
The second and third terms are the surplus generated by the products stocked in the
intermediary and purchased by consumers with s < k who visit the intermediary. The nal
term is the surplus generated by the products non-exclusively stocked in the intermediary
and purchased by consumers with s > k directly from their manufacturers.
MaximizingW (q) is the same as maximizingW (q) W (0), the welfare improvement
by the intermediary, where W (0) =
R R v
0
( + v   s) dF (s) dG is the total welfare when
there is no intermediary. After some algebraic manipulations, we can write the Lagrange
function as follows:
L =
Z
v<k
q[( + v) [F (k)  F (v)] + v   +
Z v
0
sdF (s)]| {z }
[1]
dG
+
Z
v>k
fqE[( + v) [F (k)  F (v)] + v   +
Z v
0
sdF (s)]| {z }
[2]
+ qNE[k   +
Z k
0
sdF (s)]| {z }g
[3]
dG
 h(m)[k +
Z k
0
sdF (s)] + m :
Consider rst the case of m < 1 in the optimal solution. The rst-order condition
with respect to m yields  = h0(m)[k +
R k
0
sdF (s)]. Proceeding as in the intermediarys
problem, we can see that q = 1 for v < k if and only if [1]  0. Using F (k)   F (v) =R k
v
dF (s) and the above expression for , one can verify that this is equivalent to (23).
The exclusivity arrangement does not matter. For v > k, notice that qE = 1 and qNE = 1
are mutually exclusive, and [3]  0 given h0(m)  1. Then qE = 1 if [2]  [3], which is
equivalent to (24), and qNE = 1 otherwise. The rst-order condition with respect to k
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takes the same form as in the intermediarys problem, so the parameters k,  and m solve
the same system of equations as (18) - (20).
The case with m = 1 is simple. For v > k, the conditions for qE = 1 and qNE = 1
remain the same.
Proof of Lemma 7. Let (i; j) denote the intermediarys stocking policy for man-
ufacturer i and manufacturer j of a product. Let i; j 2 f;E;NEg, where  means
the intermediary does not stock the manufacturers product, E means it contracts with
the manufacturer exclusively, and NE means it contracts with the manufacturer non-
exclusively.
In the main text we already proved results (i) and (ii) which specify the compensation
in the cases of (NE;NE) and (E;E), respectively. We now derive compensation in the re-
maining cases and then prove result (iii). First, consider (;E) and (E; ). If the relevant
manufacturer accepts the exclusive contract, it earns 0 directly from consumers, whereas if
it rejects it earns 
2
F (v) since consumers with s < v will randomly pick one manufacturer
to visit. Hence, the manufacturer needs to be compensated by 
2
F (v). Second, consider
(;NE) and (NE; ). If the relevant manufacturer accepts the non-exclusive contract, it
earns max

0; 1
2
 [F (v)  F (k)]	 directly from consumers, whereas if it rejects it earns
1
2
F (v). Therefore, it needs to be compensated by 1
2
F (min fv; kg). Third, consider
(E;NE). If manufacturer i accepts the exclusive contract, it earns 0 directly from con-
sumers, whereas if it rejects it earns max

0; 1
2
 [F (v)  F (k)]	. Manufacturer j earns
max f0;  [F (v)  F (k)]g regardless of whether it accepts or rejects the non-exclusive
contract. Hence, total compensation is max

0; 1
2
 [F (v)  F (k)]	. (The same is true for
the case of (NE;E).) Notice that in all three cases, compensation is (weakly) higher than
that in the case of (NE;NE), but the e¤ect on the search constraint (26) is the same
because all the options lead to q = 1 and qE = 0. As a result, these cases are dominated
by (NE;NE). (When v < k, (E;NE) and (NE;E) are weakly dominated.)
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